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AMENDING THE FLAWS IN THE SAFE HARBORS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: GUARDING AGAINST SYSTEMIC
RISK IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ADDING
STABILITY TO THE SYSTEM
Peter Marchetti∗
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses derivative transactions in bankruptcy. Generally, the
parties to these transactions are major participants in the financial markets.
On a worldwide basis, the estimated outstanding notional amounts of
derivative transactions are approximately $693 trillion. Certain provisions of
derivative trading contracts get special exemptions under the Bankruptcy
Code. This Article will refer to these exemptions as the “Safe Harbors.”
Congress enacted the Safe Harbors to prevent systemic risk, i.e., to prevent a
domino effect of bankruptcy filings among financial institutions. The Safe
Harbors seek to accomplish this goal by permitting a party to a derivative
trading contract to quickly terminate and liquidate its positions. Thus, these
parties are, for the most part, not subject to the normal bankruptcy process
that applies to other types of contracts.
Several recent disputes in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceedings
raise new issues that illustrate that the precise parameters of the Safe Harbors
remain unclear. This lack of clarity adversely affects the ability of market
participants to accurately perform credit risk analyses with respect to their
derivative trading counterparties and may adversely impact the ability of
certain market participants to prepare Living Wills, as required by the recently
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. The views
and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. This Article, inter alia, contains a discussion of
the following: (1) the Bench Ruling in the Metavante matter and (2) the dispute between Lehman Bros. Special
Finance Inc. and BNY Corporate Trustee Services. Transcript Regarding Hearing Held September 15, 2009 at
101–13, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2009), ECF No. 5261;
Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R.
407, 411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). The author previously discussed those cases while their appeals were
pending in the following articles: Peter Marchetti, The Bankruptcy Court’s Ruling in the Lehman Metavante
Matter—Has the Ticking Time Bomb of Enron vs. TXU Exploded or Been Defused?, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES
L. REP., Feb. 2010, at 1; Peter Marchetti, Trapped Between a Rock and a Hard Place, FUTURES &
DERIVATIVES L. REP., June 2010, at 14. To provide background and context for the topics discussed herein,
some of the discussions regarding the facts and holdings of those cases are reproduced herein.
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enacted Dodd-Frank Act. Similarly, it adversely affects the ability of a party to
reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code. This Article argues that Congress
should amend the Safe Harbors to address these issues to mitigate systemic
risk.
Several academics have argued that the Safe Harbors should be repealed.
Other recent proposals have argued that a short stay should apply before the
Safe Harbors could be used against certain large financial institutions that file
for bankruptcy protection. Congress, however, has not repealed the Safe
Harbors. This Article argues that the Safe Harbors should be amended.
Specifically, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code so that it is clear
that Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, and Flip Clauses are
not enforceable against a debtor that has filed for bankruptcy where a party
seeks to enforce such clauses based on that debtor’s financial condition or
bankruptcy filing or the financial condition or bankruptcy filing of any one of
such debtor’s affiliates. Furthermore, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy
Code and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act so that it is clear that Triangular
Setoff Clauses are enforceable where either affiliated entities both agree to the
Triangular Setoff or those affiliated entities guarantee each other’s liabilities.
Such amendments would both increase efficiency in credit risk analyses and in
the drafting of Living Wills and mitigate systemic risk.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, the use of derivatives transactions has exploded.1
According to a recent survey, more than 94% of the world’s largest
corporations use derivatives for hedging purposes.2 Generally, the parties to
these transactions are major participants in the financial markets, such as large
banks, broker-dealers, commodity traders, large corporations, and hedge funds.
The current estimated outstanding amount of such transactions on a worldwide
basis is approximately $693 trillion.3 Certain provisions of derivative trading
contracts get special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) and
are exempted from some of its very important provisions.4 These exemptions
1 These transactions are “financial product[s] that derive from an underlying market” and allow various
types of business entities, or market participants, such as banks, securities firms, and governmental units (asset
managers) to hedge different types of risk. PAUL C. HARDING, MASTERING THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENTS
(1992 AND 2002) 2 (3d ed. 2010). There are basically two types of derivative markets: exchange traded and
over-the-counter (“OTC”). Id. In exchange-traded derivative transactions, counterparties do not face each
other. Id. at 3. Instead, they face an exchange, which stands in the middle of the two parties and effectively is
each party’s counterparty. Id. at 2; see also ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BYSTEP GUIDE TO FORWARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS & OPTIONS 1 (2004) (explaining derivatives). Major derivative
market participants include dealers, hedgers, speculators, and arbitrageurs. HARDING, supra, at 2. Various
types of entities such as corporations, financial institutions, and governmental units qualify as hedgers, as they
use derivative transactions to hedge against unpredictable market changes in interest rates, currency exchange
rates, values of stocks and bonds, and prices of commodities. Id. This Article will for the most part address
derivatives such as swaps, which fall under an International Swaps and Derivatives Association Master
Agreement (“ISDA Master Agreement”). It will not discuss repurchase agreements or “repos,” which are
typically drafted with the use of a Master Repurchase Agreement.
2 Over 94% of the World’s Largest Companies Use Derivatives to Help Manage Their Risks, According
to
ISDA
Survey,
INT’L
SWAPS
&
DERIVATIVES
ASS’N
(Apr.
23,
2009),
www.isda.org/press/press042309der.pdf.
3 Statistical Release: OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-June 2013, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 2
(Nov. 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1311.pdf. This amount is the outstanding notional amount of
derivative transactions. Id.; see also HARDING, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the size of the global derivatives
market).
4 These provisions are generally part of or inserted into the most widely used form that provides the
contractual framework for documentation of these various products—the ISDA Master Agreement. See
HARDING, supra note 1, at 406. The ISDA Master Agreement is published by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”), a global financial trade association consisting of more than 830 memberinstitutions from fifty-five different countries. See id. (describing ISDA). Indeed, its membership has grown
substantially since its formation in 1985, when it had only ten members, most likely due to the increased use of
derivative transactions in the global marketplace. See id. at 18. Among ISDA’s goals are the reduction of “risk
in the derivatives and risk management business.” See About ISDA, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N,
www.isda.org/wwa/wwa_nav.html (last visited May 4, 2015). To address these goals and to create uniformity
in the trading markets, ISDA sought to publish a form that market participants could use to document their
derivative transactions. See id.
In 1987, ISDA published the Interest Rate and Currency Exchange Agreement (the “1987
Agreement”), which at that time was a major development for the derivatives market. See HARDING, supra
note 1, at 18. The 1987 Agreement provided parties with a framework agreement that could be used to
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are commonly referred to as the derivative safe harbor provisions of the Code
(the “Safe Harbors”).5
Congress enacted the Safe Harbors to prevent systemic risk, i.e., to prevent
a domino effect of bankruptcy filings among financial institutions.6 The Safe
Harbors seek to accomplish this goal by permitting a party to a derivative
trading contract to quickly terminate and liquidate its positions thereunder.7
Thus, parties to derivative trading contracts are, for the most part, not subject
to the ordinary bankruptcy process that applies to parties to other types of
contracts. Several academics have criticized the Safe Harbors and argue that
they should be repealed.8 These academics argue that the Safe Harbors do not
document interest rate swaps and currency swaps. Id. Also in 1987, in an attempt to provide consistency and
standardization among trade confirmations that confirmed the terms of interest rate swaps and currency swaps,
ISDA published several booklets that contained ISDA Definitions. Id. By 1990, ISDA published addenda that
addressed other types of derivatives trades such as interest rate caps, floors, collars, and options. Id. As the
derivatives market evolved, ISDA, in 1992, published the ISDA Master Agreement, which covered more
products than the 1987 Agreement and encouraged netting among different types of derivative products. Id.
Furthermore, as discussed in more detail below, the 1992 Agreement provided an alternative method to
be used on the early termination or “closing out” of all transactions under the agreement called the “Second
Method.” Id. at 89. Beginning in 2001, over 100 members of ISDA participated in the revising of the 1992
ISDA Master Agreement. Id. at 19. This revision process culminated with the publication of the 2002 ISDA
Master Agreement in 2003. Id.
5 The Safe Harbors are contained in 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6)–(7), (17); 546(e)–(g); 555–556; and 560–
561. Furthermore, the Safe Harbors insulate non-defaulting parties from most avoidance or “clawback” actions
brought on behalf of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 546(g) (2012). This Article will not
discuss the Safe Harbors regarding “clawback” or avoidance actions as it is beyond the scope of this Article
and has been discussed by others. See Eleanor Heard Gilbane, Testing the Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbors in
the Current Financial Crisis, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 241, 270–71 (2010) (discussing § 546(g)); Shmuel
Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1534–37 (2005) (discussing Safe Harbors regarding
avoidance actions). The Safe Harbors allow a non-defaulting party to, inter alia, (1) terminate (or close-out)
and value on a net basis all transactions documented under the ISDA Master Agreement and (2) apply
collateral to the net terminated (or closed-out) position upon the bankrupt counterparty’s insolvency. Gilbane,
supra, at 242 (discussing Interest Swap: Hearing on S. 396 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Admin. Practice
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 16 (1989)); see also Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and
Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1648 (2008).
6 See Gilbane, supra note 5, at 242–46 (detailing evolution of Safe Harbors); Edward R. Morrison &
Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors
and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 642 (2005) (discussing reasons for enacting Safe
Harbors); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, 20, 131–32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89–90,
105–06, 191–93.
7 See supra note 5.
8 See generally Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code:
Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2005); Bryan G. Faubus, Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe
Harbor for Derivatives to Combat System Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801 (2010) (arguing that the Safe Harbors should
not apply to certain types of derivatives); Stephen Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for
Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Lubben, The Flawed Case]; Stephen J. Lubben,
Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319 (2010) [hereinafter Lubben, Repeal the Safe
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accomplish their goal of preventing systemic risk.9 Similarly, more recently,
some academics have proposed that a short stay apply to a party’s ability to
utilize the Safe Harbors against certain large financial institutions that file for
bankruptcy protection.10 Despite these arguments, and despite significant
financial reforms in the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Harbors]; Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63
STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011); David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New
Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152 (2012). Others, however, have argued that the Safe Harbors
should not be repealed because they encourage derivative transactions and, as a result, increase the supply of
capital to the banking system. See generally Nathan Goralnik, Note, Bankruptcy-Proof Finance and the Supply
of Liquidity, 122 YALE L.J. 460 (2012) (arguing that Congress should not repeal the Safe Harbors). A group
comprised of some of these academics that form the Resolution Project subgroup of the Working Group on
Economic Policy at the Hoover Institution have proposed the creation of a new chapter of the Code, chapter
14, that would apply to the reorganization or liquidation of large financial institutions. TOM JACKSON, HOOVER
INST., BANKRUPTCY CODE CHAPTER 14: A PROPOSAL (2012) [hereinafter HOOVER GROUP CHAPTER 14
PROPOSAL], available at http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/bankruptcy-code-chapter-14-proposal20120228.pdf. The Hoover Institution recently revised the Hoover Group Chapter 14 Proposal. See TOM
JACKSON, BUILDING ON BANKRUPTCY: A REVISED CHAPTER 14 PROPOSAL FOR THE RECAPITALIZATION,
REORGANIZATION, OR LIQUIDATION OF LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2014) [hereinafter REVISED HOOVER
GROUP CHAPTER 14 PROPOSAL], available at http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/rp-14-july-9-tomjackson.pdf. Part of the proposal that relates to derivative transactions proposes that Congress “freeze” the
ability of a non-defaulting party to terminate a derivative trading contract for a 48-hour period following a
debtor’s bankruptcy filing. See id. at 31, 43–45. During that time period, the large financial institution subject
to chapter 14 protection would attempt to transfer its derivative transactions to a bridge company that would
accept a transfer of those derivative transactions. See id. at 21, 42. Based on the work of the Hoover
Institution, there is current legislation pending in the U.S. Senate that is aimed creating a chapter 14 of the
Code to specifically deal with a bankruptcy filing of a large financial institution. See Taxpayer Protection and
Responsible Resolution Act, S. 1861, 113th Cong. (2013), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/senate-bill/1861 (last visited May 4, 2015). Similarly, the House of Representatives passed a related
bill on December 1, 2014. See Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. 5421, 113th Cong. (2014);
H.R. REP. NO. 113-630 (2014). As of May 2015, the House Bill has been received by the Senate and referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary. Instead of creating a new chapter 14 of the Code to deal with large financial
institutions that seek bankruptcy protection, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014 seeks to create a
new Subchapter V of the Code to deal with such entities. See H.R. 5421. Both the Taxpayer Protection and
Responsible Resolution Act and Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act contain similar proposals for a short stay
of up to forty-eight hours that would prevent a Non-defaulting Party from terminating a derivatives trading
contract with a large, systemically important financial institutions that qualify as a “covered financial
institution.” See id. § 3; S. 1861, § 3. Some have questioned whether a 48-hour stay would be a sufficient time
period to effectively transfer a covered financial institution’s derivative trading contracts to a bridge company.
See, e.g., Hearing on the “Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014” Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 Cong. 58 (2014) (statement of
Stephen E. Hessler, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP). There are various additional parts of these companion bills
that are beyond the scope of this Article and will not be discussed herein.
9 See generally Edwards & Morrison, supra note 8; Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, supra note 8;
Lubben, The Flawed Case, supra note 8; Roe, supra note 8; Skeel & Jackson, supra note 8.
10 See REVISED HOOVER GROUP CHAPTER 14 PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at 21–22. See generally S. 1861;
H.R. 5421.
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Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), Congress refused to repeal the Safe
Harbors.11
As Congress has refused to repeal the Safe Harbors, this Article takes a
different course than prior scholarship and focuses on clarifying the Safe
Harbors. Indeed, several recent disputes that took place during Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy proceedings regarding issues of first impression illustrate
that the precise parameters of the Safe Harbors remain unclear. This lack of
clarity adversely affects (1) the ability of financial institutions and other market
participants to accurately perform credit risk analyses with respect to their
derivative trading counterparties; (2) the ability of a party to a derivative
trading contract that files for bankruptcy protection (a “Debtor”) to reorganize
its business affairs under the Code;12 and (3) the ability of certain financial
institutions that are required by the Dodd-Frank Act to formulate “Resolution
Plans” or “Living Wills.”13 The result is an increase in systemic risk and an
increase in the lack of stability in our financial system. This Article argues that
Congress should amend the Safe Harbors to address these issues so that
systemic risk can be mitigated. Specifically, Congress should amend the Code
so that it is clear that Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, and
Flip Clauses are not enforceable against a Debtor where a party seeks to
enforce such clauses based on the Debtor’s financial condition or bankruptcy
filing or the financial condition or bankruptcy filing of any one of the Debtor’s
affiliates.14 Furthermore, Congress should amend the Code and Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act so that it is clear that Triangular Setoff Clauses are
enforceable where either (1) affiliated entities agree to the Triangular Setoff or
11 Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides an alternative insolvency regime to the Code for certain types
of financial institutions and, like the Code, contains safe harbors for derivative trading contracts. See DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.); Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, DoddFrank for Bankruptcy Lawyers, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 308–13 (2011) (discussing Safe Harbors
under Title II).
12 As used herein, “Debtor” means a party that files a bankruptcy petition and becomes a debtor under the
Code.
13 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012);
see also 12 C.F.R. § 360.10 (2012). See infra note 121 for the statutory guidelines on which companies are
required to form Resolution Plans.
14 After this Article was accepted for publication and during the editing process, the American
Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 issued its Final Report and
Recommendations (the “ABI Commission Report”) regarding reform of the Code. See generally AM. BANKR.
INST., AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2014), available at https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h.
Similar to one of the proposals made in this Article, a portion of the ABI Commission Report proposed that
Walkaway Clauses be rendered unenforceable in chapter 11 cases. See id. at 106–07.
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(2) those affiliated entities guarantee each other’s liabilities. Such amendments
would increase efficiency in credit risk analyses and mitigate systemic risk.15
First, this Article will present a brief overview of derivative transactions
and the players involved in such transactions. That overview will briefly
discuss certain contractual provisions commonly contained in the most widelyused derivative trading contract in the world—the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) Master Agreement.16 Similarly, that section
will discuss the ambiguities surrounding the enforceability of such provisions
in the bankruptcy context. Second, this Article will present an overview of the
ISDA Master Agreement, focusing on the provisions that are crucial in the
bankruptcy or insolvency context. Third, this Article will present a brief
overview of the Safe Harbors and certain other provisions of the Code that are
vital to an understanding of how the Code intersects with these various
provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement.17 Fourth, this Article will briefly
discuss certain provisions of the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act that relate to
15 In cases where a large financial institution is a Debtor, consistent with the Revised Hoover Group
Chapter 14 Proposal, the author agrees that some form of short stay should apply to a Non-defaulting Party’s
right to terminate (and set off among) its derivative trading contracts with such a Debtor, which would permit
such a Debtor to transfer its derivative trading contracts to another solvent entity. See, e.g., REVISED HOOVER
GROUP CHAPTER 14 PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at 31–32. Assuming such a stay is implemented through
legislation, clarity is still needed with respect to the enforceability of Payments Suspension Clauses,
Walkaway Clauses, Flip Clauses, and Triangular Setoff Clauses in derivative trading contracts to which such a
Debtor remains a party where (1) such a stay expires and (2) such a Debtor is not successful in transferring or
“assuming and assigning” those outstanding derivative trading contracts to a solvent third party. Furthermore,
the proposals made in this Article may be subject to some criticism. Generally speaking, although different
subsidiaries of a corporation may fall within the same “corporate family,” each such affiliate is generally a
separate legal entity with “its own assets and creditors.” See Michael Chaisanguanthum, Charter: The Most
Important Recent Bankruptcy Decision for Secured Creditors, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 9, 20–21 (2010)
(criticizing holding in JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Commc’ns Operating, LLC (In re Charter
Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)). In a jointly administered chapter 11 bankruptcy case of a
parent and its subsidiaries, the corporate separateness of those entities along with the separateness of their
assets and creditors should be respected, unless the bankruptcy court enters an order for substantive
consolidation of the various entities. See id. at 269–70. Although those general norms of corporate
separateness and bankruptcy law should prevail in the vast majority of situations, the nature of the intersection
of the ISDA Master Agreement and the Code do present a unique situation. Furthermore, if Congress amends
the Code to incorporate the proposals contained herein, parties will know ahead of time what their rights
would be in the case of a bankruptcy filing of an entity and its affiliates. Accordingly, the parties will be able
to conduct their credit analysis accordingly before entering into the derivative transaction(s).
16 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT § 14 (2002) [hereinafter 2002
ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT]. These clauses are Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip
Clauses, and Triangular Setoff Clauses.
17 This Article will not present an in-depth discussion of the history of the Safe Harbors, as other
prominent practitioners and scholars have thoroughly written on that topic. See Vasser, supra note 5, at 1507–
21; see also Gilbane, supra note 5, at 270–71 (discussing the history and evolution of Safe Harbors).
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the issues discussed in this Article. Next, this Article will discuss and analyze
recent litigation that sent reverberations throughout the multi-trillion dollar
derivatives markets involving issues of first impression with respect to the
intersection of these provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement and the Code.18
This Article will conclude that Congress should further legislate to resolve
some of the ambiguities that continue to exist with regard to the Safe Harbors.
Failure to do so will have an adverse effect on the market because absent such
legislation, financial institutions and other market participants lack the ability
to precisely analyze their credit risk with regard to potential counterparties.
Furthermore, for those financial institutions that are required by the DoddFrank Act to formulate Living Wills, this lack of clarity may impact their
ability to effectively do so. Such a lack of clarity and predictability injects
significant uncertainty in any credit risk analysis in the context of derivatives
transactions and, as a result, seriously hampers parties’ ability to conduct
sound credit risk analysis. Clarifying legislation would not only afford market
participants increased ability to conduct credit analysis, but also would inject
increased certainty regarding such issues into the chapter 11 process, because a
chapter 11 debtor would have certainty regarding its rights with respect to its
various derivative counterparties.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Derivative Transactions and the Players Involved
Derivatives encompass various types of products including, among others,
interest rate swaps, interest rate collars, interest rate caps, forward contracts
involving commodities, currency swaps, equity derivatives, options, and credit
default swaps.19 Generally, the value of many derivative transactions such as

18 This Part will also discuss how courts in other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, have
reached diametrically opposing conclusions from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York regarding several of the same issues.
19 HARDING, supra note 1, at 4–8; CHRISTIAN A. JOHNSON, A GUIDE TO USING AND NEGOTIATING OTC
DERIVATIVES DOCUMENTATION 8–14 (2005). Most of the cases discussed in this Article involved one or more
swap agreements, which can generally be described as:

[A] contract between two parties . . . to exchange (“swap”) cash flows at specified intervals,
calculated by reference to an index. Parties can swap payments based on a number of indices
including interest rates, currency rates and security or commodity prices.
Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savs. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 11
U.S.C. § 101(53B) (2012) (defining swap agreement under the Code).
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interest rate swaps and currency swaps change over time so that, on a
particular date, the value of a particular derivative transaction may be “in the
money” or an asset to one party while simultaneously being “out of the
money” or a liability to the counterparty.20 Over time, as markets fluctuate, the
status of the parties may shift, such that the party that at one time held the inthe-money position, may, at a different time hold the out-of-the-money
position.21
Many of the parties that enter into derivative transactions are financial
institutions with complex corporate structures.22 Generally, the structures of
such entities include a parent holding corporation (“Parent”) and a number of
wholly-owned subsidiaries.23 The subsidiaries may include regulated entities
such as a registered broker-dealer, an investment advisor entity, or a regulated
bank subsidiary that must be separate as a result of certain regulatory rules.24
Although technically organized as separate business entities within the same
corporate enterprise, these entities are generally interconnected, operating out
of the same headquarters and often staffed with overlapping employees.25
Likewise, for credit risk management purposes, derivative counterparties to
such entities typically deal with the Parent and its different subsidiaries as if
they are one entity.26
For a number of different reasons, a party to a derivative transaction, a
corporate affiliate or Parent of that party serving as its guarantor
(“Guarantor”),27 or one or several of that party’s specific corporate affiliates28
20 See ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, DOCUMENTATION FOR DERIVATIVES 219–20 (4th ed.
2002) (discussing parties that are in the money or out of the money). Some exceptions are pre-paid interest rate
caps, options, and floors. Id. at 221, 439.
21 See id. at 219–20.
22 Many other types of business entities also enter into derivative transactions. See generally Stephanie
Russell-Kraft, Push for Derivatives Market Clarity Leads to More Confusion, LAW360 (Oct. 20, 2014, 1:57
PM ET), www.law360.com/articles/585583. Such business entities that are not financial institutions are
generally referred to as “end-users.” See id.
23 See Richard J. Herring, Essay, The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Policy: An
Application to the Subprime Crisis, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 403 (2009).
24 Some subsidiaries also take the form of Special Purpose Entities. See, e.g., Mark Kronfeld, Vincent
Indelicato & Chris Theodoris, The Murkiness of Corporate Separateness in Chapter 11, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
June 2013, at 46, 47. Applicable tax law may drive the form of such corporate structures but is not discussed
herein.
25 See Stephen A. Lumpkin, Risks in Financial Group Structures, 2010 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS,
no. 2, at 105.
26 See generally Daniel P. Winikka & John H. Chase, When Business Efficiency and Bankruptcy Collide:
Resolving Intercompany Claims, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. July 2012, at 4.
27 Such a guarantor is referred to in the ISDA Master Agreement as the “Credit Support Provider.” 2002
ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 14. For purposes of simplicity and clarity, this Article uses the
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may find itself in financial distress.29 Such financial distress may cause the
party, its Guarantor, or one or more of its affiliates to enter into formal
restructuring or insolvency proceedings, which may take place under chapter
11 or, for certain types of entities, under the recently-enacted Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act.30
Moreover, for various reasons, the bankruptcy or other insolvency filing of
a party to a derivative trading contract may occur on different dates, but in
somewhat close temporal proximity with the date on which its ParentGuarantor or one or more of its affiliates files for bankruptcy.31 Because of the
constantly shifting values inherent in most derivative transactions, at the time
two parties enter into a derivatives transaction, it may be almost impossible to
gauge whether (1) one of the parties to such a transaction, its Guarantor, or one
or more of its affiliates will file for bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings
and (2) either of the two parties, at the time of such a bankruptcy or insolvency
filing, will have an in-the-money position or an out-of-the-money position.32

term Guarantor when referring to the Credit Support Provider. Furthermore, this Article will use the term
“Parent-Guarantor,” when referring to the specific scenario in which a parent corporate entity serves as the
Credit Support Provider (or Guarantor) for the liabilities of one or more of its subsidiaries under an ISDA
Master Agreement.
28 Such an affiliate is referred to in the ISDA Master Agreement as a “Specified Entity.” Id.
29 Under the ISDA Master Agreement, a third party that provides a guarantee or other credit support is
called a “Credit Support Provider.” See id.; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 1992 ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT § 14 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT]. Pursuant to the ISDA Master
Agreement, the bankruptcy filing, or similar insolvency event by a Credit Support Provider of a party to an
ISDA Master Agreement constitutes an Event of Default. 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16,
§ 5(a). Furthermore, pursuant to the ISDA Master Agreement, a bankruptcy filing or similar insolvency event
by an entity listed in the Schedule to the ISDA Master Agreement as a Specified Entity constitutes an Event of
Default. See id.
30 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 201–17, 124
Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–94). If the particular entity is a
registered broker-dealer, then the entity will be liquidated under the Securities Investors Protection Act of
1970 (“SIPA”). Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970) (codified as amended beginning with 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aaa (2012)). For purposes of this Article, SIPA proceedings are similar to bankruptcy proceedings. If,
however, the particular entity is a bank that takes deposits insured by the FDIC, then that entity will be
liquidated under the applicable provisions of Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–35a (2012).
Generally speaking, an insurance company cannot file for bankruptcy under the Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(b)(2). Instead, an insurance company that is insolvent will be liquidated under the insurance insolvency
law of the state in which it is organized. 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D § 87:10 (2008).
31 See, e.g., Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 418–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
32 See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 219–20 (discussing fluctuating values of derivative
transactions).
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A bankruptcy filing constitutes an Event of Default under the ISDA Master
Agreement.33 Any Event of Default brings into consideration important
provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement or related transaction documents,
which, upon a party’s default (“Defaulting Party”), permit the non-defaulting
party (“Non-defaulting Party”34) to do any of the following: (1) terminate (or
close out) and value on a net basis all transactions documented under the ISDA
Master Agreement;35 (2) apply collateral to the net terminated (or closed-out)
position upon the bankrupt counterparty’s insolvency;36 (3) withhold, suspend
(“Payment Suspension Clause”),37 or walkaway (“Walkaway Clause”) from
any payments otherwise due and owing to the bankrupt counterparty under the
ISDA Master Agreement;38 (4) elevate, or flip, its position in payment priority
provisions (“Flip Clause”) contained in structured finance transactions;39 or (5)
exercise the right of setoff between or among different affiliates of the
bankrupt counterparty (“Triangular Setoff Clause”).40

33 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 5(a)(vii); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT,
supra note 16, § 5(a)(vii).
34 By Non-defaulting Party, it means a Non-defaulting Party under the ISDA Master Agreement that is
not a Debtor under the Code or similar formal insolvency proceedings.
35 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6; 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 16, § 6. After this Article was accepted for publication and during its editing process, ISDA announced a
new ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol. See Anne E. Beaumont, Banks Agree to ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol
Despite Buy-Side Resistance but Practical Questions Remain, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), 46 SRLR 2088
(BL) (Oct. 27, 2014). This protocol only applies to “major global banks” that agree to the protocol. See id. A
signatory to the protocol agrees to suspend its right to terminate an ISDA Master Agreement for a 48-hour
period following the bankruptcy filing of another protocol signatory. See id.
36 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 1994 ISDA CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX ¶ 8 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 ISDA CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX]; see also GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 1169–77 (discussing rights
of secured parties under the ISDA Master Agreement).
37 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 2(a)(iii); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT,
supra note 16, § 2(a)(iii).
38 See discussion of Harrier, infra note 104.
39 See, e.g., Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 418–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). A Flip Clause is typically contained in the payment
waterfall provision of an indenture connected to a structured finance transaction and is typically not found in
an ISDA Master Agreement. See Evan Jones et al., Lehman Bankruptcy Judge Prevents Trigger of CDO
Subordination Provision Based on Credit Support Provider and Swap Counterparty Bankruptcy Filings, 127
BANKING L.J. 338, 338–39 (2010). A derivative transaction that is documented under an ISDA Master
Agreement, however, is generally part of the overall structured financing transaction to which the Flip Clause
applies. See id. at 341–43.
40 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, USER’S GUIDE TO THE 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, at
68–69 (2003) [hereinafter USER’S GUIDE TO THE 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT]; INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, at 57 (1993) [hereinafter
USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT]. Such theoretical language would read as follows:
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The predictability of a Non-defaulting Party’s ability to enforce its rights
under these clauses upon its counterparty’s bankruptcy filing is crucial to
effective credit risk management. Equally crucial to effective credit risk
management is the predictability of a Non-defaulting Party’s rights in
situations where the Guarantor of its counterparty or an affiliate of its
counterparty files for bankruptcy on a date different from its counterparty or
simultaneously with its counterparty.41
The enforceability of the Non-defaulting Party’s rights under the ISDA
Master Agreement is not only important to the Non-defaulting Party—it is also
vitally important to the Debtor, its Guarantor, its affiliates, and, as a corollary,
to the creditor body of such a Debtor. This creditor body may be composed of
market participants that hold claims against the Debtor, the recovery on which
will be diminished if Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip
Clauses, or Triangular Setoff Clauses are deemed to be enforceable by Nondefaulting Parties that have out-of-the-money derivative positions in relation to
the Debtor.42 The chief underlying policy of chapter 11 is to successfully
reorganize a troubled company.43 Likewise, a Debtor has a fiduciary duty to
maximize recoveries for all creditor constituencies of the bankruptcy estate.44
In a chapter 11 proceeding, the Debtor has a limited exclusive time period to

[U]pon the designation of any Early Termination Date, in addition to and not in limitation of any
other right or remedy . . . under applicable law the Non-defaulting Party or Non-affected Party (in
either case, “X”) may without prior notice to any person set off any sum or obligation (whether
or not arising under this Agreement . . .) owed by the Defaulting Party or Affected Party (in
either case, “Y”) to X or any Affiliate of X against any sum or obligation (whether or not arising
under this Agreement . . .) owed by X or any Affiliate of X to Y.
See In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 458 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing a Triangular Setoff
Clause).
41 These different filing dates will generally occur in close temporal proximity to one another.
42 The creditor body may also be comprised of claims traders, which may acquire the claims of other
market participants at steep discounts so that such claims traders can profit from the chapter 11 process. See
generally Sam Roberge, Maneuvering in the Shadows of the Bankruptcy Code: How to Invest In or Take Over
Bankrupt Companies Within the Limits of the Bankruptcy Code, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 73 (2013).
43 In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing
policy of chapter 11). In Drexel, the bankruptcy court stated, “Congress has recognized that the continuation of
the operations of a debtor’s business as a viable entity benefits the national economy through the preservation
of jobs and continued production of goods and services.” Id.
44 In re Reliant Energy Channelview L.P., 594 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that a debtor in
possession has a fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate); W. Marion Wilson, Comment,
Trust Me, I’m a Lawyer: Restoring Faith in Fiduciaries by Dumping “Due Diligence” and Tolling the Statute
of Limitations for Postpetition Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Chapter 11, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 637, 641–
42 (2006) (discussing duties of chapter 11 debtor). A chapter 11 debtor has a fiduciary duty to “protect and
maximize the return on estate assets.” Wilson, supra, at 641 (citations omitted).
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propose a plan of reorganization.45 Generally, to confirm the plan, at least one
class of impaired creditors must vote in favor of the plan.46
If major litigation arises regarding ambiguities surrounding the rights of a
Non-defaulting Party in relation to a Debtor, its Guarantor, or one of its
affiliates, the Debtor’s ability to effectively and efficiently monetize any “inthe-money” positions it may have under various derivative contracts will be
hampered.47 Instead of focusing its time on the chapter 11 plan proposal and
confirmation, the Debtor will have to spend time and effort in costly litigation.
If the Code is not clear regarding the rights of parties with respect to Payment
Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip Clauses, and Triangular Setoff
Clauses, the debtor may be inclined to settle litigation regarding such clauses,
which may ultimately lead to smaller recoveries for the Debtor’s creditors.
Likewise, if any of these clauses are enforceable against a Defaulting Party,
they would have an adverse effect on the ability of the Debtor to monetize its
in-the-money position, and would adversely affect certain creditors of the
Debtor, while favoring certain other creditors of the Debtor. Although the Safe
Harbors insulate derivatives from certain provisions of the Code, the extent to
which these clauses are enforceable in bankruptcy is unclear.
The recent financial crisis, which involved the chapter 11 bankruptcy
filings of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and many of its affiliates,
has demonstrated that major ambiguities continue to exist regarding the outer
bounds of the Safe Harbors as they apply to derivative transactions. Several
recent court decisions involving issues of first impression in the United States
and in the United Kingdom have involved, among other things, the following
issues: (1) the extent to which, if any, Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway
Clauses, Flip Clauses, and Triangular Setoff Clauses contained in the ISDA
Master Agreement or related transaction documents are enforceable upon a
Defaulting Party’s bankruptcy filing and (2) if any of these clauses are
enforceable if the Guarantor or affiliate of the Defaulting Party files for
bankruptcy or insolvency on a date that is different from, but in close temporal

45 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012). Generally, a Debtor may have an exclusive period of up to eighteen months
after the petition date to file a chapter 11 plan. Id. § 1121(a)–(b), (d).
46 Id. § 1129(a)(10).
47 See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 268 (discussing the importance of predictability of
enforceability of terms of ISDA Master Agreement).
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proximity to, the date of the bankruptcy or insolvency filing of the Defaulting
party.48
B. The ISDA Master Agreement
This Subpart of the Article will present an overview of the ISDA Master
Agreement and associated documents that are commonly referred to as the
“ISDA documentation architecture.”49 In particular, it will focus on the
provisions that are crucial in the bankruptcy or insolvency context. Those
provisions are the following: Netting, Events of Default, Early Termination (or
Close-out), Valuation, Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip
Clauses, and Cross-Affiliate Netting Clauses.50
1. The ISDA Architecture
Parties to derivative transactions generally use either the 1992 ISDA
Master Agreement or the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement and alter the general
terms of the ISDA Master Agreement by negotiating a schedule
(“Schedule”).51 Generally, the ISDA Master Agreement, as supplemented by
48 See Transcript Regarding Hearing Held September 15, 2009 at 101–13, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter September 15 Transcript], ECF No. 5261;
see also Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422
B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). The first of these decisions was the bench ruling in the Metavante matter,
which held that (1) an out-of-the-money Non-defaulting Party to a swap agreement with an in-the-money
bankrupt counterparty could not rely on section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement to withhold payments
otherwise due and payable to that bankrupt counterparty based on its (or its credit support provider’s) status as
a debtor under the Code and (2) a Non-defaulting Party waives its right to terminate the ISDA Master
Agreement if it does not “promptly” terminate following the bankrupt counterparty’s bankruptcy filing. See
September 15 Transcript, supra. In the second decision, an adversary proceeding brought by Lehman Brothers
Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of LBHI, against BNY Corp. Trustee Services
Ltd., the court held that a Flip Clause contained in certain transaction documents related to a collateralized
debt obligation (“CDO”) transaction was not enforceable in the bankruptcy context. BNY, 422 B.R. at 407.
Interestingly, in both the Metavante and BNY matters, the bankruptcy court allowed a debtor to avail itself of
the ipso facto protections in §§ 365 and 541 of the Code based on either the debtor’s own bankruptcy filing or
the earlier bankruptcy filing of its parent-Credit Support Provider. See infra Parts III.A, C.
49 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 19–27 (discussing ISDA documentation architecture).
50 See id. at 406–12. Some provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement or documentation architecture are
beyond the focus of this Article. For a thorough discussion of the ISDA Master Agreement, see generally
GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 219; HARDING, supra note 1; USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT, supra note 40; USER’S GUIDE TO THE 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 40. Instead,
this section focuses on the provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement that are of key importance to market
participants in the context of chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings or other insolvency proceedings.
51 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 11; see also JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 14, 16; USER’S GUIDE TO THE
1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at 2; USER’S GUIDE TO THE 2002 ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at 1. For example, through the Schedule, the parties can elect to apply, disapply,
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the Schedule, contains the overarching non-economic terms that will apply to
the various trades or transactions (each, a “Transaction”).52 Parties often
collateralize their positions under the ISDA Master Agreement by negotiating
a Credit Support Annex (“CSA”), which forms part of the Schedule.53 The
ISDA Master Agreement, as supplemented by the Schedule and the CSA,
increases the efficiency with which market participants can enter into
derivative transactions, because once the parties negotiate an ISDA Master
Agreement, they simply need to set forth the economic terms of each trade in a
confirmation (“Confirmation”).54
The Confirmation supplements and forms a part of the ISDA Master
Agreement.55 The Confirmation contains a date on which the transaction or
trade begins (“Trade Date”) and the scheduled termination date (“Scheduled
Termination Date”), or the date on which the trade will expire.56 The
Confirmation generally contains payment dates or reset dates (“Reset Date”),
which occur on a quarterly or monthly basis. The ISDA Master Agreement, the
Schedule, the CSA, and any and all Confirmations are collectively referred to
as the “Agreement.”57 Thus, if two parties have an interest rate swap and a
currency swap, one Confirmation would be used to document the economic
terms of the interest rate swap, while another Confirmation would be used to
document the terms of the currency swap. Both Confirmations, however,
would fall under the ISDA Master Agreement, as modified by the Schedule
and collateralized by the CSA. It is not uncommon for larger institutions to
have thousands of trades, each documented by its own Confirmation, that fall
under one ISDA Master Agreement.
On each Reset Date, the calculation agent (“Calculation Agent”) specified
in the ISDA Schedule determines (1) which party is in the money and which
party is out of the money with respect to the particular trade and (2) the value
amend, or supplement the standard terms of the ISDA Master Agreement. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 15–
16.
52 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 24–28.
53 See id. at 19; see also GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 1088; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N,
USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1994 ISDA CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX 1 (1994).
54 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, pmbl.; 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 16, pmbl.
55 See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 370–71; HARDING, supra note 1, at 22–23; JOHNSON, supra
note 19, at 25.
56 In ISDA parlance, the Trade Date is generally referred to as the “Trade Effective Date” and the
“Scheduled Termination Date” is generally referred to as the “Termination Date.”
57 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 19–21; see also 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29,
pmbl.; 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, pmbl.
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of each in-the-money and out-of-the-money position.58 Generally, the parties
then net or set off their different positions on the applicable Reset Date, and the
party that is out of the money on that Reset Date on a net basis makes a net
payment to the party that is in the money on a net basis. This is referred to as
payment netting (“Payment Netting”).59
2. Important Provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement in the Bankruptcy
in Insolvency Context
a. Netting
Netting is a central concept to the ISDA Master Agreement. There are
basically two types of netting under the ISDA Master Agreement: Payment
Netting and Close-out Netting.60 Payment Netting is described above and
applies on the scheduled Reset Dates. Payment Netting applies while there are
active Transactions under the ISDA Master Agreement. Close-out Netting,
however, applies when an Event of Default occurs under an ISDA Master
Agreement and the Non-defaulting Party elects to terminate the ISDA Master
Agreement.61 Close-out Netting involves three steps: (1) early termination; (2)
valuation of each closed-out position; and (3) netting among the closed-out
positions to determine the net balance.
If a Non-defaulting Party could not enforce the Close-out Netting
provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement upon its counterparty’s bankruptcy
or insolvency filing, the Non-defaulting Party could be subject to “cherry
picking” by the Defaulting Party, and its exposure could be substantially

58 The ISDA Master Agreement requires this determination to be made in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner. GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 754; HARDING, supra note 1, at 547;
JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 44.
59 Payment Netting is essentially the same as set-off. The ISDA Master Agreement also contains a
feature that allows parties to elect for multiple transaction netting, which allows parties to net among all
transactions documented under the ISDA Master Agreement, so that only one payment will be made to the inthe-money party by the out-of-the-money party on the relevant Reset Date. HARDING, supra note 1, at 12, 438,
556–59.
60 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 2(c); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 16, § 2(c).
61 Close-out netting also applies if an early termination event occurs and a party entitled to do so
terminates the ISDA Master Agreement. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 397. Early termination events are, for
the most part, beyond the scope of this Article and will not be discussed herein in great detail. The ISDA
Master Agreement contains eight Events of Default and eight Termination Events. 1992 ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 5(a)–(b); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 5(a)–(b); see also
HARDING, supra note 1, at 56–85, 200–23.
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increased.62 For example, such cherry picking would occur if the Defaulting
Party could avail itself to certain Code provisions to assume favorable
contracts and “reject” unfavorable contracts. If the Non-defaulting Party could
not enforce the Close-out Netting provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement, it
would risk having to pay the Defaulting Party 100% of the amount owed under
transactions that were in the money with respect to the Defaulting Party.
Simultaneously, the Non-defaulting Party risks having to wait a substantial
amount of time to receive distributions, if any, in a chapter 11 case, on the
amounts owed under transactions that were out of the money with respect to
the Defaulting Party.
The enforceability of Close-out Netting provisions is not only important to
the individual Non-defaulting Party but is also vitally important to the
worldwide derivative markets. In the derivative markets, it is very common for
market participants to engage in “back-to-back” trades. As a result of these
back-to-back trades, market participants are highly interconnected. If the
netting provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement are not enforceable upon a
counterparty’s bankruptcy, a series of defaults could occur within the financial
system, resulting in a “domino effect” of failing institutions, and ultimately, a
collapse of the entire financial system. Because market participants are
concerned with this systemic risk, ISDA hires leading law firms from fifty-four
different countries to obtain opinions regarding the enforceability of the ISDA
Master Agreement’s Netting and early termination provisions in the event of a
counterparty insolvency.63
b. Events of Default
The ISDA Master Agreement contains eight “Events of Default.”64
Included among the Events of Default is a bankruptcy filing or similar
insolvency event of a party to the ISDA Master Agreement, its Guarantor, or

62 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 35, 408; see also GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 314, 326;
JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 109; Morrison & Riegel, supra note 6, at 642 (discussing cherry picking).
63 HARDING, supra note 1, at 71 (discussing ISDA Netting Opinions). These netting opinions are
available on the ISDA website; however, ISDA membership is required to view the opinions. See Opinions,
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/
opinions/ (last visited May 31, 2015).
64 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 5; 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 16, § 5; HARDING, supra note 1, at 56–73. Unlike Events of Default, however, Termination Events are not
“fault” based. HARDING, supra note 1, at 225. Termination Events allow a party to terminate upon an event
that “substantially alters the [t]ransaction economics or the risk profile” of the counterparty. See GOOCH &
KLEIN, supra note 20, at 840.
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any one of its affiliates.65 The other Events of Default are not directly
insolvency-related and include events commonly found in commercial lending
documents.66
Assuming the parties did not elect for Automatic Early Termination, which
will be discussed in more detail below, upon the occurrence of an Event of
Default, the Non-defaulting Party has the ability to terminate the ISDA Master
Agreement by delivering a termination notice to the Defaulting Party.67 For the
termination notice to be valid, the Event of Default must be continuing at the
time the Non-defaulting Party delivers the early termination notice.68 Thus, if
the Event of Default is cured before the Non-defaulting Party delivers the
termination notice, the Non-defaulting Party will lose its right to terminate the
ISDA Master Agreement.69 Once the Non-defaulting Party delivers the
termination notice in accordance with the terms of the ISDA Master
Agreement, however, the ISDA Master Agreement will be deemed to have
terminated and the Defaulting Party no longer has the right to cure the Event of
Default.70
c. Automatic Early Termination
The Schedule to the ISDA Master Agreement allows the parties to elect for
“Automatic Early Termination” to apply if a bankruptcy Event of Default
occurs with respect to one of the parties, one of their Guarantors, or one of
their affiliates.71 If the parties select Automatic Early Termination, the ISDA
Master Agreement will be deemed to have automatically terminated
immediately before or after the occurrence of certain enumerated bankruptcy
65 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 5(a)(vii); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 16, § 5(a)(vii). For a bankruptcy filing of an affiliate to trigger an event of default, the specific affiliate
must be listed as a Specified Entity in the ISDA Schedule. 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29,
§ 5(a)(vii); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 5(a)(vii); see also HARDING, supra note 1, at
207, 240, 422–23, 552–53.
66 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 202–23.
67 See id. at 93, 253. Although the Non-defaulting Party has this ability, it is not obligated to terminate
the ISDA Master Agreement if the parties did not elect for Automatic Early Termination. Id.
68 See id. at 59, 205.
69 See id. at 87, 249–55.
70 Id. at 88, 249. Upon termination, all outstanding transactions that fall under the ISDA Agreement are
terminated and there is “no turning back.” Id. at 88, 249, 252–53. To terminate the ISDA Master Agreement in
this manner, the Non-defaulting Party gives notice to the Defaulting Party of the Event of Default and
designates an early termination date. See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(a); 2002 ISDA
MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 6(a); HARDING, supra note 1, at 92–93, 252–53.
71 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(a); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 16, § 6(a).
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Events of Default.72 In some jurisdictions, parties must select Automatic Early
Termination to have the right to terminate.73
In many jurisdictions, including the United States and England, however,
parties do not have to select Automatic Early Termination in order to have the
right to terminate an ISDA Master Agreement upon an Event of Default by the
Defaulting Party, its Guarantor, or one of its affiliates. In these jurisdictions,
parties generally do not elect for Automatic Early Termination to apply for
several reasons. One reason is the desire by the Non-defaulting Party to
maintain control of when and whether to terminate an ISDA Master Agreement
upon a bankruptcy filing by the Defaulting Party, its Guarantor, or one of its
affiliates.74 For example, if the parties selected Automatic Early Termination
and one of the parties, its Guarantor, or one of its affiliates files for bankruptcy
while it is in the money, the Non-defaulting Party would have to immediately
pay the “Early Termination Amount” to the Defaulting Party.75

72 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(a); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 16, § 6(a); see also HARDING, supra note 1, at 92–93, 252–53. If the parties select Automatic Early
Termination to apply, and if a bankruptcy Event of Default occurs under § 5(a)(vii)(4) of the ISDA Master
Agreement, which includes the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings that are not dismissed within a
certain time period, then the ISDA Master Agreement will be deemed to have automatically terminated
immediately before the filing or commencement of such proceedings. See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT,
supra note 29, § 6(a); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 6(a); HARDING, supra note 1, at 92–
93, 252–53, 493–96.
73 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 495–96. Those jurisdictions are Brazil, Denmark, Germany, Israel,
Japan, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, and Switzerland. Id.
74 Id. at 402; see also JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 115–17; USER’S GUIDE TO THE 2002 ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at 20–21.
75 Likewise, if the parties select Automatic Early Termination, the Non-defaulting Party may not know
that a bankruptcy Event of Default occurred with respect to its counterparty, its counterparty’s Guarantor, or
one of its counterparty’s affiliates, triggering the Early Termination of the ISDA Master Agreement. HARDING,
supra note 1, at 89–91, 251. If this is the case, by the time the Non-defaulting Party becomes aware that a
bankruptcy Event of Default occurred with respect to its counterparty, its counterparty’s Guarantor, or one of
its counterparty’s affiliates, the Non-defaulting Party could be left with un-hedged positions while markets
move against it, making it more costly to enter into replacement hedges. See id. at 93, 253; see also USER’S
GUIDE TO THE 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at 21. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the
markets may have moved against the Non-defaulting Party by the time it realizes that such an Event of Default
occurred. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 93, 253. In such a case, if there is a market meltdown in a particular
sector and if the Market Quotation valuation methodology applies under a 1992 ISDA Master Agreement,
significant valuation disparities between the Non-defaulting Party and a chapter 11 debtor could arise because
of the difficulty obtaining quotes in a particular market. See id. at 89–91. This, in turn, could lead to litigation
between the Non-defaulting Party and the chapter 11 debtor regarding the proper valuation of the Early
Termination Amount. Id. If, on the other hand, Automatic Early Termination did not apply in such a situation,
the Non-defaulting Party could select an Early Termination Date on which it could easily obtain quotes that
would be more difficult for a chapter 11 debtor to challenge. Id.
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If, however, Automatic Early Termination is not selected, the Nondefaulting Party, at least for a short period of time, could perform the costbenefit analysis to determine whether it is beneficial to terminate the ISDA
Master Agreement upon the bankruptcy filing. Alternatively, it could consider
projections as to how quickly the market may turn in the Non-defaulting
Party’s favor while it makes periodic payments that are due on the Reset Dates,
which will likely be less than an Early Termination Amount. Similarly, the
selection of Automatic Early Termination would prevent the Non-defaulting
Party from cooperating with the debtor to enter into some type of mutually
beneficial assignment arrangement with a third party, through which the debtor
could essentially “sell” its ISDA Master Agreement to a third party.
Following the early termination of the ISDA Master Agreement, the Nondefaulting Party must either, “[o]n or as soon as reasonably practicable
following the occurrence of an Early Termination Date,” provide a statement
calculating its amount of damages (“Calculation Statement”), which essentially
is the Non-defaulting Party’s net loss or net gain.76 Under the 1992 ISDA
Master Agreement, this amount is referred to as the “Early Termination
Amount.” Under the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, however, it is referred to
as the “Close-out Amount.”77 Indeed, one of the major differences between the
1992 and 2002 ISDA Master Agreements is the process for determining the
amount of these damages.

76 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(d); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note
16, § 6(d). This section raises an ambiguity in the ISDA Master Agreement itself. First, how long is “as soon
as reasonably practicable”? See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(d); 2002 ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 6(d). Second, what if the Non-defaulting Party fails to deliver the Calculation
Statement “as soon as reasonably practicable” after the notice of Early Termination Date and the Nondefaulting Party owes the Defaulting Party the Early Termination (or Close-out) Amount? Will the Nondefaulting Party in that case be deemed to have violated the Agreement by not timely delivering the
Calculation Statement and paying the Early Termination (or Close-out) Amount? Will the Non-defaulting
Party, in such a scenario, be subject to default interest? This section of the ISDA Master Agreement could be
improved by inserting a specified time period within which the Non-defaulting Party must deliver the
Calculation Statement. It should be noted that, whether or not ISDA amends this section of the ISDA Master
Agreement as suggested, these issues could arise if the parties chose Automatic Early Termination to apply
and a bankruptcy Event of Default triggering termination occurs. In such a case, the Non-defaulting Party may
not be aware of the termination of the ISDA Master Agreement, and, as a result, fail to deliver the Calculation
Statement within the required time, subjecting the Non-defaulting Party to Default Interest.
77 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 14.
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i. Calculation of the Early Termination Amount Under the 1992 ISDA
Master Agreement, and the First Method and Second Method
The 1992 ISDA Master Agreement provides two alternative means by
which the Non-defaulting Party can calculate the Early Termination Amount:
Market Quotation or Loss.78 Essentially, by selecting Market Quotation, the
Non-defaulting Party seeks quotes from four leading dealers in derivative
transactions as to how much they would pay (or charge) the Non-defaulting
Party to “step into the shoes of” the Defaulting Party.79 Next, pursuant to
Market Quotation, the Non-defaulting Party adds (1) all “Unpaid Amounts”
and (2) the amount representing the net of (a) the aggregate of each
Transaction that is out of the money to the Non-defaulting Party and (b) the
aggregate of each Transaction that is in the money to the Non-defaulting
Party.80 The result is the Early Termination Amount.
By contrast, the use of the Loss methodology can apply in two different
scenarios under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement: (1) the parties select for
Loss to apply in the Schedule or (2) the parties select Market Quotation to
apply in the Schedule but either the Non-defaulting Party, at the time of early
termination, cannot obtain at least three quotes from Reference Market Makers
or the Market Quotation methodology produces a result that is not
“commercially reasonable.”81 Loss is a general indemnification provision and
is defined as “an amount that [the Non-defaulting Party] reasonably determines
in good faith to be its total losses and costs.”82 The Loss methodology sets
forth a nonexclusive list of factors that the Non-defaulting Party may utilize to
calculate its Loss, which includes “any loss of bargain, cost of funding or, at
the election of such party but without duplication, loss or cost incurred as a
result of its terminating, liquidating, obtaining or reestablishing any hedge or
related trading position (or any gain resulting from any of them).”83
78 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(e)(i). Market Quotation has “the effect of
preserving for the [Non-defaulting Party] the economic equivalent of the payments and deliveries that are
scheduled to have due dates after the Early Termination Date.” GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 241.
79 The 1992 ISDA Master Agreement defines such dealers as “Reference Market Makers.” See 1992
ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 14; see also Phil Weeber et al., Market Practices for Settling
Derivatives in Bankruptcy: Part I, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, at 26, 74; GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20,
at 241–43.
80 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 14.
81 Id. In illiquid markets, it can be virtually impossible to obtain quotes from three Reference Market
Makers. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 267.
82 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 14.
83 Id.; see also GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 235–38; HARDING, supra note 1, at 134–35; JOHNSON,
supra note 19, at 83–84; USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at 26. Loss
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Next, the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement requires the parties to select either
of two methods with regard to calculating the Early Termination Amount:
“First Method” or “Second Method.”84 The First Method is essentially a
Walkaway Clause.85 Under this method, if the Non-defaulting Party, after
using Market Quotation or Loss, owes the Early Termination Amount to the
Defaulting Party, the Non-defaulting Party does not have to pay the Defaulting
Party.86 Under the Second Method, however, if the Non-defaulting Party, after
using Market Quotation or Loss, owes the Early Termination Amount to the
Defaulting Party, the Non-defaulting Party will have to pay the Early
Termination Amount to the Defaulting Party.87
ii. Net Loss or Gain Calculation Under the 2002 ISDA Master
Agreement
The 2002 ISDA Master Agreement provides a different methodology by
which the Non-defaulting Party calculates its net loss or gain, referred to as the
Close-out Amount, under which the Non-defaulting Party calculates its gains,
losses, and costs involved in replacing or realizing the economic equivalent of
the terminated transactions.88 The Close-out Amount methodology is more
allows, but does not require, the Non-defaulting Party to determine Loss by receiving quotations from dealers
in relevant markets. 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 14; see also GOOCH & KLEIN, supra
note 20, at 235; HARDING, supra note 1, at 134–35; USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT,
supra note 40, at 26. Unpaid Amounts are not calculated separately when parties select Loss to apply in the
Schedule. See USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at 26. If, however, the
Non-defaulting Party uses Loss as a fall back to Market Quotation, then Unpaid Amounts can be separately
calculated. See id. at 26. As with Market Quotation, Loss may be used by the Non-defaulting Party for “one or
more Terminated Transactions.” See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 235. Also under Loss, as under
Market Quotation, the Non-defaulting Party nets its in-the-money transaction amounts against out-of-themoney transaction amounts. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 88–89. If the result is positive, the Non-defaulting
Party has a claim against the Defaulting Party. Id. If the result is negative, and if the parties chose “Second
Method” to apply, the Non-defaulting Party will owe the Close-out Amount to the Defaulting Party. Id. at 89–
90; see infra Part I.B.2.c.iii.
84 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(e).
85 HARDING, supra note 1, at 89; JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 83; see infra Part I.B.2.e.
86 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(e)(i)(1)–(2); see also HARDING, supra note 1, at
89; JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 83. The First Method is not often used anymore because financial regulators do
not allow banks to use the First Method if they desire to have derivative contracts recognized for regulatory net
capital requirements relating to counterparty risk. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 89, 250 (suggesting that First
Method punishes a Defaulting Party); see also USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra
note 40, at 24 (discussing bank regulations requiring the use of Second Method in relation to net capital
requirements). That being said, section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master agreement could be interpreted to convert
the Second Method into the First Method. See infra Part I.B.2.d.
87 See HARDING, supra note 1, at 89; see also JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 83.
88 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 6(e)(i) (providing for application of Close-out
Amount method); see also GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 243; HARDING, supra note 1, at 266–71;
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flexible than the Market Quotation or Loss methodologies and permits the
Non-defaulting Party to consider a wide-range of relevant information in
calculating the Close-out Amount.89 Then, similar to Market Quotation and
Loss methodologies,90 after the Non-defaulting Party calculates the Close-out
Amount for each transaction, it then nets in-the-money transaction amounts
against out-of-the-money transaction amounts.91 If the result is positive, the
Non-defaulting Party has a claim against the Defaulting Party. If the result is
negative, the Non-defaulting Party will owe the Close-out Amount to the
Defaulting Party.92 The 2002 ISDA Master Agreement completely does away
with the First Method.93
iii. Calculation of Early Termination Amount or Close-Out Amount
The Market Quotation, Loss, and Close-out Amount methodologies each
take into account the life of each terminated derivative transaction as part of
the valuation process of arriving at the Early Termination Amount or Close-out
Amount.94 Thus, if the Non-defaulting Party is out of the money, a significant
difference could exist between a payment due to the Defaulting Party on a
particular Reset Date and the payment due as the result of an early termination
of an ISDA Master Agreement resulting from the bankruptcy filing of the
Defaulting Party, its Guarantor, or one of its affiliates. Most likely, in such a
case, the payment due by the Non-defaulting Party as a result of an early
termination will be a much higher amount than the payment due on a particular
Reset Date.

JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 55–56. “Close-out Amount” is defined as the amount of losses that the Nondefaulting Party would incur or the amount of gains the Non-defaulting Party would realize “under then
prevailing circumstances . . . in replacing, or in providing the [Non-defaulting Party] the economic equivalent
of (a) the material terms of [the] Terminated Transaction[s] . . . and (b) the option rights of the parties in
respect of [the] Terminated Transaction[s].” 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 14.
89 Compare 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 14, with 2002 ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 14. Note that, unlike the Market Quotation Methodology, the Close-out Amount
Methodology does not require the Non-defaulting Party to seek four quotations from Reference Market
Makers. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 268; see also JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 87–88. But similar to the
Loss methodology, the Amount methodology involves elements of good faith and commercial reasonableness
by requiring the Non-defaulting Party to use “commercially reasonable procedures” aimed at producing a
“commercially reasonable result.” 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 14.
90 See supra note 83.
91 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 6.
92 Id.
93 HARDING, supra note 1, at 251; JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 87.
94 See USER’S GUIDE TO THE 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 40, at 26.
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iv. Seizure and Application of Collateral
If an Event of Default is triggered by the bankruptcy or similar insolvency
filing by a party, its Guarantor, or one of its affiliates at the time when the
Non-defaulting Party is in the money following the early termination of the
ISDA Master Agreement, the Non-defaulting Party can apply any collateral it
holds under the CSA to the Early Termination Amount or Close-out Amount it
is owed.95 If such collateral is not sufficient to satisfy the amount owed to the
Non-defaulting Party, the Non-defaulting Party will have an unsecured claim
against the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. As discussed in more detail below, the
Safe Harbors permit the Non-defaulting Party to engage in this activity without
seeking to lift the automatic stay that applies in bankruptcy proceedings and
irrespective of certain provisions of the Code that invalidate ipso facto clauses
in contracts.96
d. Payment Suspension Clause
Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement (“Payment Suspension
Clause”) is one of the most controversial provisions of the ISDA Master
Agreement in the bankruptcy context. It states that a Non-defaulting Party may
withhold payments otherwise due and payable to the Defaulting Party and
provides, in pertinent part:
Each obligation of each party [to make each payment or delivery
specified in each Confirmation to be made by it, subject to the other
provisions of this Agreement] is subject to (1) the condition
precedent that no Event of Default or Potential Event of Default with
respect to the other party has occurred and is continuing, (2) the
condition precedent that no Early Termination Date in respect of the
relevant Transaction has occurred or been effectively designated and
(3) each other applicable condition precedent specified in this
Agreement.97

95 See 1994 ISDA CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX, supra note 36, ¶ 8; see also GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20,
at 1169–77 (discussing rights of a secured party under an ISDA master agreement). See supra note 53 and
accompanying text for a discussion of CSAs.
96 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(17), 560 (2012).
97 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 2(a)(iii). Section 2(a)(iii) of the 2002 ISDA Master
Agreement is substantially similar. See 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 2(a)(iii). After this
Article was accepted for publication, but during the editorial process, ISDA, in June 2014, published a Form of
Amendment to the ISDA Master Agreement for use in relation to section 2(a)(iii). See INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, AMENDMENT TO THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT FOR USE IN RELATION TO SECTION
2(A)(III) (2014) [hereinafter ISDA AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2(A)(III)], available at http://www.isda.org/cgi-
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Thus, if a party to an ISDA Master Agreement, its Credit Support Provider,
or any Specified Entity listed in a Schedule files for bankruptcy protection
under the Code or triggers another Event of Default, section 2(a)(iii) allows the
Non-defaulting Party to withhold or suspend payments otherwise due and
payable from the Defaulting Party while it is in insolvency proceedings. As a
result, section 2(a)(iii) could be interpreted to convert the Second Method to
the First Method and allow the Non-defaulting Party to refrain—and in some
circumstances “walkaway”—from its payment obligations while its
counterparty is in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings.98
Over the past several years, courts have grappled with various issues
related to section 2(a)(iii) in the insolvency context.99 Those situations
generally dealt with a situation where the Non-defaulting Party was out of the
money and its counterparty filed for bankruptcy or other insolvency
proceedings while at the same time being in the money.100 If section (2)(a)(iii)
were enforceable in such a scenario, it would have a devastating impact on the
creditors of the Debtor101 because the Non-defaulting Party could simply wait
indefinitely while not making any payments to the Debtor, until the market
shifts back into the Non-defaulting Party’s favor, to terminate the ISDA Master
Agreement.102
In the meantime, the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate and its creditors would be
deprived of any payments that would have been otherwise due and payable by
the Non-defaulting Party to the Debtor on the Reset Dates that elapsed between

bin/_isdadocsdownload/download.asp?DownloadID=1033; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, GUIDANCE
NOTE ON THE FORM OF AMENDMENT TO ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT FOR USE IN RELATION TO SECTION
2(A)(III) (2014), available at http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf/Guidance_Note_amendment_agreement.
pdf. The ISDA Section 2(a)(iii) Amendment will apply only if all parties to the ISDA Master Agreement agree
to the Amendment. See generally ISDA AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2(A)(III), supra. If both parties agree to the
ISDA Section 2(a)(iii) Amendment, a Non-defaulting Party will have to terminate the ISDA Master
Agreement within a specified time period of the bankruptcy filing of the Debtor (or the bankruptcy filing of
any one of its affiliates). Id.
98 See 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 29, § 2(a)(iii); 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT,
supra note 16, § 2(a)(iii); Christopher J. Mertens, Australian Insolvency Law and the 1992 ISDA Master
Agreement—Catalyst, Reaction, and Solution, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 233, 255 (2006).
99 See, e.g., Enron Austl. Fin. Pty. Ltd v TXU Elec. Ltd. [2003] NSWSC 1169 (Austl.); Lomas v. JFB
Firth Rixson Inc., [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3372, [2011] 2 BCLC 120 (Eng.) (International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc. joined as intervenor); September 15 Transcript, supra note 48, at 101–13.
100 See sources cited supra note 99.
101 The author uses the term Debtor herein to refer to a Defaulting Party that is a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code.
102 See Kingsley T.W. Ong, The ISDA Master Agreement: Insolvency Stalemate and Endgame Solutions
for Hong Kong Liquidators, 40 HONG KONG L.J. 337, 342 (2010).
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the date of the bankruptcy filing and the date on which the market shifts back
into the Non-defaulting Party’s favor. Likewise, in such a scenario, the Nondefaulting Party would be reluctant to terminate the ISDA Master Agreement,
because if it does so it would likely owe the Early Termination Amount, which
would likely be much larger than the amount it would owe to the Debtorcounterparty on a particular Reset Date, because the Early Termination
Amount takes into account future valuations. For this reason, bankruptcy and
insolvency practitioners have referred to section 2(a)(iii) as the “flawed asset
clause.”103
e. Walkaway Clauses
In certain derivative transactions, market participants may insert into a
Confirmation what is commonly referred to as a Walkaway Clause, which
excuses a Non-defaulting Party from making a payment otherwise due as a
result of an Early Termination originating from the bankruptcy filing of the
Debtor, its Guarantor, or any one of its affiliates.104 If Walkaway Clauses were
enforceable in bankruptcy, they would have a devastating impact on the
Debtor’s ability to reorganize because they would deprive the Debtor—and in
turn, the creditors—the value of the Early Termination Amount or Close-out
Amount, even if at the time of the early termination, the Debtor is “in the
money.”105
f. Flip Clauses
A Flip Clause is a clause that usually appears in transaction documents
associated with collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) transactions and other
structured finance transactions.106 Flip Clauses are important in the derivatives

103

See id. at 339–42.
One example would be the Walkaway Clause in a credit default swap. See, e.g., Complaint at 2–5,
Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Harrier Fin. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 09-01241, 2009
WL 1430616 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2009) [hereinafter Harrier Complaint] (describing the
Walkaway Clause used in credit default swap transaction). Under the Dodd-Frank Act, section 2(a)(iii) would
also qualify as a “Walkaway Clause.” See Irene Chapple, Lehman Bros.’ Swaps Counterparties in Court, Case
Could Extend, DOW JONES DAILY BANKR. REV. (Dec. 7, 2010), http://bankruptcynews.dowjones.com/article?
pid=10&an=DJFDBR0020101207e6c7000b6&ReturnUrl.
105 See Schuyler K. Henderson, Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis, 44 BUS. LAW. 365, 391
(1989) (stating that Walkaway Clauses would have an adverse impact on creditors of an in-the-money
defaulting swap party).
106 See Ong, supra note 102, at 351 n.60 (stating that a Flip Clause is a market-standard clause). The Flip
Clause is aimed at “disincentivis[ing] default by a swap counterparty and ensur[ing] that the defaulting swap
104
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context because they may affect the rights of the parties to the ISDA Master
Agreement.107 Like the Payment Suspension Clauses and Walkaway Clauses,
the predictability of whether a Flip Clause is enforceable in the insolvency
context is crucial to sound credit risk management and analysis.
To understand how a Flip Clause works, one must understand the basics of
a CDO and other structured finance transactions. In these transactions, a
sponsor generally establishes a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”), which sells
notes to investors or noteholders under an indenture.108 These noteholders
essentially loan money to the SPV by purchasing notes from the SPV. The
SPV generally uses the proceeds generated from these sales to purchase a pool
of assets. These assets serve as collateral for the notes.109 Then, rating
agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, assign ratings to the
notes and generally require Flip Clauses.110 The indenture trustee is usually
tasked with the holding and administration of the collateral for the various
parties to the transactions.111
Virtually all CDO and other structured finance transactions use derivative
transactions.112 These derivative transactions generally take the form of credit
default swaps or interest rate swaps and are documented under an ISDA
Master Agreement, executed between a swap provider and the SPV.113 As
there are various different parties to these transactions, such as the indenture
trustee, the swap provider, and the noteholders, they generally contain payment
waterfall provisions that establish a payment priority.114 The payment waterfall
generally provides two different payment priorities: (1) the payment priority
that applies while there is no Event of Default under the transaction documents
associated with the structure; and (2) the payment waterfall that applies if an

counterparty does not benefit from its own default by continuing to be paid at a senior position in the
waterfall.” Id.
107 See Jones et al., supra note 39, at 344–45.
108 See CDO Primer, DUFF & PHELPS (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.duffandphelps.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/DP_CDO_Primer.pdf. Generally speaking, the sponsor of a CDO will be a financial
institution such as a bank. Id.
109 The notes may be issued in different classes or tranches. See generally Richard D. Cudahy, The
Coming Demise of Deregulation II, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 543, 548–49 (2009).
110 See Jones et al., supra note 39, at 343–45.
111 See generally Position Paper, Am. Bankers Ass’n, Corporate Trust Comm., The Trustee’s Role in
Asset-Backed Securities (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.aba.com/ABA/Documents/press/roleoftheTrusteeinassetbackedsecuritiesJuly2010.pdf.
112 See generally GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 646, 655; Jones et al., supra note 39.
113 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 646, 655
114 See Jones et al., supra note 39, at 339; see also CDO Primer, supra note 108.

MARCHETTI GALLEYSPROOFS

332

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

1/26/2016 2:18 PM

[Vol. 31

Event of Default is declared under the transaction documents causing the
collateral to be liquidated.115
Here is where the Flip Clause steps in. It reorders the payment priorities set
forth in the payment waterfall provision following the declaration of an Event
of Default.116 The goal of the Flip Clause is to prevent a swap provider that has
caused an Event of Default under its agreement with an SPV from being paid
an Early Termination Amount until after the SPV fully satisfies its obligations
owed to the noteholders that loaned money or invested in the SPV.117
g. Triangular Setoff Clauses
Parties will often agree to add language to the ISDA Schedule that permits
the out-of-the-money party or any of its affiliates, in the case of an Event of
Default, to reduce its Early Termination Amount payable to the in-the-money
party or any of its affiliates. This is done through a Triangular Setoff Clause,
which allows setoff of the Early Termination Amount against amounts payable
under any other agreements between the out-of-the-money party or its affiliates
and the in-the-money party or its affiliates.118
h. The Dodd-Frank Act and Clearing
In response to the financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act,
which introduced sweeping reforms to the derivatives markets.119 Other than
Title II, which established the Orderly Liquidation Authority,120 several
reforms introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act relate to the issues discussed in this
Article: (1) a requirement that certain entities defined as “Covered Companies”
periodically submit “Resolution Plans” or “Living Wills” to the FDIC and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”) setting forth a
plan for the Covered Company’s resolution under the Code in the event the
Covered Company becomes insolvent;121 (2) a requirement that certain types
115

See Jones et al., supra note 39, at 339.
See id.
117 See Peter Marchetti, Trapped Between a Rock and a Hard Place, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP.,
June 2010, at 14, 15.
118 See sources cited and quoted text supra note 40.
119 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.); see John Carney, Too Big Not to
Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at A31.
120 See infra Part II.E.
121 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012);
see also 12 C.F.R. § 360.10 (2012). Covered Companies that are required to submit Living Wills are (1)
116
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of swaps be cleared by a Derivatives Clearing Organization
(“Clearinghouse”);122 and (3) a requirement that certain financial institutions
“push out” certain swap transactions to affiliates that are not eligible for either
deposit insurance or access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window (the
“Swaps Push Out Rule”).123
Under the second noted reform, the Clearinghouse, swaps will now be
categorized as “cleared swaps” and “uncleared swaps.”124 Most likely,
uncleared swaps will be documented under the ISDA Master Agreement as
described above.125 Cleared swaps, however, will involve the use of a Clearing
Member that stands between a party that is not a Clearing Member, i.e., an
End-User, and the Clearinghouse.126 Although the ISDA Master Agreement
might still be used to document cleared swaps, such transactions will most
likely involve a Clearing Agreement either along with the ISDA Master
Agreement or instead of it.127 In contrast to the ISDA architecture, there is not

nonbank financial companies supervised by the FRB; (2) U.S. bank holding companies with assets of $50
billion or more; and (3) certain foreign banks or companies that have assets of $50 billion or more on a global
basis and are considered bank holding companies under section 8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 165; see also 12 C.F.R. § 360.10.
122 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (requiring
“clearing” for certain types of swap transactions).
123 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 716, 15 U.S.C. § 3805 (requiring
“swaps push-out” for certain entities). The Living Wills requirement and the Swaps Push Out Rule are
important with respect to the issue of Triangular Setoff discussed below. After this Article was accepted for
publication and during the editorial process, the President of the United States, on December 16, 2014, signed
an omnibus spending bill that amended and significantly reduced the scope of the Swaps Push Out Rule. See
Swaps Pushout Provision Amended: Pushout Requirement in Section 716 Now Limited to Certain ABS Swaps,
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/2014-12-17_
Swaps_Pushout_Provision_Amended.pdf; Julian Hammar, New Law Limits the Swaps Pushout Requirement to
Apply Only to Certain ABS Swaps, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Dec. 22, 2014), available at http://www.mofo.
com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/12/141222SwapsPushoutRequirements.pdf. Under this amendment to the
Swaps Push Out Rule, certain financial institutions only have to transfer specified structured finance swaps to
an affiliate. See id.
124 See generally Sherri Venokur, What Customers Should Look Out For in FCM Clearing Agreements,
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., June 2013, at 1.
125 See id.
126 See generally Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101
GEO. L.J. 445, 449–53 (2013) (describing structure of the Clearinghouse). Mandatory clearing of swap
transactions will add a level of complexity (and additional parties) to what were, for approximately the past
thirty years, bilateral transactions under the ISDA architecture. See Robert Pickel, The Bilateral World vs. The
Cleared World, DERIVATIVIEWS (Apr. 24, 2012), http://isda.derivativiews.org/2012/04/24/the-bilateral-worldvs-the-cleared-world/.
127 See generally Venokur, supra note 124 (discussing Clearing Agreements); Preparing for OTC
Derivatives Clearing, SIDLEY AUSTIN, L.L.P. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.sidley.com/InvestmentProducts_
Update_032411/.
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an “industry standard form” of Clearing Agreement.128 The issues discussed in
this Article, however, are also applicable to Clearing Agreements, especially
because such agreements are likely to contain Triangular Setoff Clauses.129
II. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE DODDFRANK ACT IN RELATION TO THE RIGHTS UNDER ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT
A. Property of the Bankruptcy Estate and the Automatic Stay
The underlying policy of chapter 11 bankruptcy is to foster the
reorganization of a distressed business entity.130 There is a strong policy that
favors giving the Debtor a reprieve so that it can continue operating its
business.131 This policy does not favor the immediate liquidation of the
Debtor.132 Instead, it is based on the idea that the Debtor’s ability to reorganize
preserves its employees’ jobs and preserves that Debtor’s ability to continue to
provide services, thus benefitting the U.S. economy.133
Several events simultaneously occur under the Code immediately when an
entity files a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (the “Petition Date”). The entity
becomes a Debtor and a bankruptcy estate is created.134 All of that Debtor’s
property rights become property of that bankruptcy estate.135 Included in such
property rights are all of the Debtor’s rights in its contracts that exist as of the
Petition Date.136 To protect the property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and
to give the Debtor a “breathing spell,” an automatic stay is imposed and
automatically halts any efforts by creditors of the Debtor to commence or

128

See Venokur, supra note 124, at 2 (indicating lack of standard clearing documentation).
See id. at 5 (discussing the use of Triangular Setoff Clauses in Clearing Agreements.) But as a
Clearinghouse stands between the various parties to a particular derivatives trade, Payment Suspension
Clauses or Walkaway Clauses are not likely to be part of Clearing Agreements.
130 In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 759–60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
131 In re Talladega Steaks, Inc., 50 B.R. 42, 44 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
132 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). A chapter 11 debtor can also liquidate its
assets through a chapter 11 plan. See 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(9)(C)(11) (2012). In such situations, a Debtor will
sell substantially all of its assets through a § 363 sale and then distribute the proceeds of that sale to the various
creditors though a chapter 11 plan. See Deborah Thorne, Pay to Play: Liquidation of Assets Using Chapter 11
Should Provide Unsecured Creditors with a Share of the Proceeds, BUS. CREDIT, June 2009, available at
http://www.btlaw.com/files/BC-June09_Thorne.pdf.
133 See NLRB, 465 U.S. at 528.
134 11 U.S.C. § 541.
135 See id.
136 See id.
129
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continue any litigation against the Debtor or its property or to enforce any liens
against the Debtor or its property.137
Generally, secured creditors must seek permission of the bankruptcy court
to lift the automatic stay to seize their collateral.138 A Debtor, however,
generally may continue to use the collateral to operate its business and to
facilitate the reorganization process, though there are special limitations on the
use of cash collateral.139 When a Debtor uses a secured creditor’s collateral, it
typically agrees to give the secured creditor adequate protection, which is a
remedy designed to protect the secured creditor against any diminution in the
value of its collateral.140
B. Executory Contracts
The Code gives a Debtor extensive powers with respect to executory
contracts, which are contracts under “which performance remains due to some
extent on both sides.”141 Under the Code, with court approval, a Debtor can
assume any executory contract that is of value to the bankruptcy estate or can
reject any executory contract that is not of value to the bankruptcy estate.142 A
Debtor uses its business judgment in deciding whether to assume or reject an
executory contract143 and may make this decision until the date on which a
bankruptcy court confirms a chapter 11 plan.144
137

See id. § 362. Thus the automatic stay is extensive. See id.
See id. § 362(d).
139 See id. §§ 363(b)–(c), 1108.
140 See id. § 362(e); see also id. § 361.
141 See In re Teligent, Inc., 268 B.R. 723, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing to the Countryman Test for
determining whether a contract qualifies as an executory contract). Under the Countryman Test, an executory
contract is “a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so
far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
performance of the other.” Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 365; see also Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973) (discussing the definition of an executory contract).
142 See 11 U.S.C. § 365.
143 In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., 466 B.R. 239, 242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
144 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
A substantial time period can exist between the petition date and the date on which the bankruptcy court
confirms a chapter 11 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121. Generally, a Debtor may have an exclusive period of
eighteen months after the petition date to file a chapter 11 plan. See id. A counterparty to an executory contract
can file a motion requesting bankruptcy court approval to force a Debtor to assume or reject an executory
contract within a shorter time period. See id. § 365(d)(2); In re Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 695, 702–03 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing ability of counterparty to compel Debtor’s assumption or rejection of executory
contract). In making a decision on such a motion, a bankruptcy court, using its discretion, will decide whether
the debtor had reasonable time to decide on assumption or rejection of the particular contract. Enron, 279 B.R.
at 702–03. In making this decision, the court examines several factors, including: (1) the damage the non138
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If a Debtor decides to assume an executory contract, it will have the
obligation to cure all monetary defaults under that contract and provide
adequate assurance of future performance.145 If, however, the Debtor rejects an
executory contract, the contract is treated as if the Debtor breached it, and the
counterparty will have a claim for rejection damages.146 The Debtor’s rejection
of an executory contract does not terminate the executory contract.147 Instead,
it renders the contract breached.148
The calculation of rejection damages related to terminated derivative
transactions are governed by § 562 of the Code.149 Section 562 requires such
rejection damages to be calculated as of the earlier of the rejection date or the
termination date of the derivative transaction.150 If no reasonable determinants
of value exist on the appropriate date, damages are to be measured on the next
date that such determinants exist.151 Although § 562 requires calculation of
rejection damages of a rejected ISDA Master Agreement during the
postpetition period, the Code only allows the Non-defaulting Party to file a
prepetition unsecured claim, which most likely precludes asserting a claim for
a postpetition administrative expense.152

debtor counterparty will suffer beyond the compensation available under the Code; (2) the importance of the
executory contract to the debtor’s business and reorganization; (3) whether the debtor has had adequate time to
evaluate its financial situation and potential value of its assets in formulating a plan; and (4) whether the
exclusive time within which the debtor may propose a plan has terminated. The court will also consider the
complexity of the case, including the number of contracts to be evaluated, and the need for a court to
determine the validity of such contracts. Id.
145 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A).
146 See id. §§ 365(g), 502(g).
147 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 144, ¶ 365.02.
148 Id.
149 See 11 U.S.C. § 562(a).
150 See id. § 562(b).
151 See id.; see also In re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 411 B.R. 181, 189–93 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)
(discussing § 562).
152 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(2). The Code normally allows an administrative expense for postpetition value
from an executory contract received by the debtor between the Petition Date and the date of the rejection of the
contract. Section 502(g)(2) provides in pertinent part: “A claim for damages calculated in accordance with
section 562 shall be allowed . . . or disallowed . . . as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of
the petition.” Id. To successfully assert a claim for an administrative expense under § 503, the claimant must
demonstrate (1) that the claim arose out of a transaction between the claimant and the debtor during the
postpetition period and (2) that the transaction conferred a benefit on the estate in a demonstrable way. See,
e.g., In re Bayou Group, L.L.C., 431 B.R. 549, 557–58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also 11 U.S.C. § 503;
Douglas J. Bordewick, The Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59
AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 221–26 (1985) (discussing the ability of a non-debtor party to an executory contract
with a chapter 11 debtor to assert a claim for an administrative claim).
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C. Ipso Facto Clauses and §§ 365 and 541 of the Code
The Code prohibits a Debtor’s counterparty to an executory contract from
withholding performance due to the Debtor while the Debtor decides to assume
or reject the executory contract.153 Generally speaking, during this time period,
the counterparty has an obligation to perform its obligations due to the Debtor
under the executory contract.154 Likewise, in most situations, the Code renders
unenforceable any contractual clause that permits a non-debtor party to an
executory contract to modify or terminate (or enforce a provision that
automatically modifies or terminates) the executory contract based on the
Debtor’s bankruptcy filing.155 Such contractual clauses are referred to as “ipso
facto” clauses.156 Section 365(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired
lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or
obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or
modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely
because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned
on—
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any
time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a
case under this title or a custodian before such
commencement.157

Similarly, § 541(c)(1) also invalidates ipso facto clauses and provides, in
pertinent part:
[A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the
estate . . . notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer
instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . that is conditioned
on . . . the commencement of a case under this title . . . and that
effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or
termination of the debtor’s interest in property.158

153
154
155
156
157
158

See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 541(c)(1). Similarly, § 363(l) provides in pertinent part:
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In summary, under the Code, a contractual clause is generally
unenforceable if it (1) allows a party to unilaterally terminate, modify, or
suspend a Debtor’s interest in property or (2) functions as a forfeiture,
modification, or termination of a Debtor’s interest in property.
D. The Safe Harbors
Aimed at protecting the financial industry,159 Congress enacted the Safe
Harbors to address various types of derivative transactions in bankruptcy.160
The Safe Harbors allow the Non-defaulting Party to a derivative transaction
with a Debtor to terminate, liquidate, accelerate, net out, and set off among
such derivative transactions upon the bankruptcy filing of the Debtor.161
Sections 560 and 561 partly annul § 365(e)(1) because they allow a Nondefaulting Party to specified derivative transactions to terminate, liquidate, and
accelerate such contracts, or to set off or net out termination values or payment
amounts owed thereunder, notwithstanding the counterparties’ bankruptcy
filing.162 The Safe Harbors contained in § 362 also override some of the
general provisions of § 362, as they allow a Non-defaulting Party to
automatically seize any collateral it holds and to apply such collateral to any
amounts owed to it as a result of the termination of a swap agreement.163 The
financial crisis of 2008 tested the outer bounds of the Safe Harbors, especially
with respect to Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip Clauses,
and Triangular Setoff Clauses.164

Subject to the provisions of section 365, [a debtor] may use, sell or lease property under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section, . . . notwithstanding any provision in a contract, a lease, or
applicable law that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the
commencement of a case under this title concerning the debtor, or on the appointment of or the
taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian, and that effects, or gives an
option to effect, a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor’s interest in such
property.
Id. § 363(l) (emphasis added).
159 See Morrison & Riegel, supra note 6, at 642 (discussing reason for enacting safe harbors); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 3, 20, 131, 132 (2005).
160 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6)–(7), (17); 546(e)–(g); 555–556; 560–561.
161 See id.
162 See id. §§ 365(e)(1), 560–561.
163 See id. § 362(b)(6)–(7), (17); see also Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, supra note 8, at 323.
164 See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Inc. (UBS Decision), 458 B.R. 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); Lehman
Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007–1 Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 452 B.R. 31
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 422 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); September
15 Transcript, supra note 48; Harrier Complaint, supra note 104.

MARCHETTI GALLEYSPROOFS

2015]

1/26/2016 2:18 PM

AMENDING THE FLAWS

339

E. The Safe Harbors in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act
While parts of the Dodd-Frank Act are aimed at regulating derivative
transactions (e.g., through Clearinghouses),165 Title II of the Act provides an
alternative insolvency regime to the Code called the Orderly Liquidation
Authority, which applies to certain types of financial institutions called
Significantly Important Financial Institutions (“SIFI’s”).166 Congress intended
that Title II would be used only as a “last resort” in very limited situations
where, inter alia, the applicable regulatory authorities deem that a bankruptcy
case would not be appropriate.167 Title II contains safe harbors for derivative
trading contracts.168
The safe harbors contained in Title II, however, are slightly different in two
respects from the Safe Harbors in the Code. First, under Title II, the Nondefaulting Party cannot exercise its right to terminate, liquidate, and net out its
derivative transactions with the SIFI that is subject to a Title II proceeding for
a period of one business day after the day on which the SIFI enters into a Title
II proceeding.169 Secondly, it seems quite clear that in a Title II proceeding, no
Payment Suspension Clause or Walkaway Clause would be enforceable under
any circumstances.170 But issues surrounding Triangular Setoff Clauses could
arise in a Title II proceeding, as the language regarding setoff in Title II is
essentially the same as the language contained in § 553 of the Code.171
165

Supra Part I.B.2.h.
See Baird & Morrison, supra note 11, at 308–13 (discussing Title II). The Taxpayer Protection and
Responsible Resolution Act, which is currently pending in the U.S. Senate, proposes to repeal Title II and to
replace it with a new Chapter 14 of the Code. See Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S.
1861, 113th Cong. §§ 2(a), 4 (2013).
167 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381(a)(8), 5383(a)(1)(A); Bruce Grohsgal, Case in Brief Against “Chapter 14,”
AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2014, at 44. Indeed, for a SIFI to file for orderly liquidation under Title II, strict
criteria must be met, including, but not limited to, a finding by the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury (after
consulting with the President of the U.S.) that “the failure [of the SIFI] and its resolution under [the Code]
would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b).
168 See 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)(A)(i).
169 Id. § 5390(c)(10)(B).
170 See id. § 5390(c)(8)(F) (invalidating Walkaway Clauses). Title II broadly defines “Walkaway Clauses”
as:
166

[A]ny provision in a [Safe-Harbored contract or ISDA Master Agreement] that suspends,
conditions, or extinguishes a payment obligation of a party, in whole or in part, or does not create
a payment obligation of a party that would otherwise exist, solely because of the status of such
party as a [Non-defaulting] [P]arty in connection with [its formal insolvency proceedings under
Title II] . . . .
Id.

171

Compare id. § 5390(a)(12), with 11 U.S.C. § 553.
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III. LITIGATION INVOLVING THE INTERSECTION OF THE ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
During the financial crisis of 2008, several storied investment banking
institutions were on the verge of failure. JP Morgan Chase purchased Bear
Stearns in a distressed sale.172 Around the same time, Bank of America
acquired Merrill Lynch, which was also in financial distress.173 Unable to
receive government assistance in the form of a “bailout” and unable to
structure a sale to a third party, on September 15, 2008 (the “LBHI Petition
Date”), LBHI, filed for chapter 11 protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York.174 LBHI was the fourth-largest investment
banking firm in the United States.175 On the same day, Lehman Brothers
International (Europe) (“LBIE”), based in London, filed for administration in
the United Kingdom.176 On October 8, 2009 (the “LBSF Petition Date”),
Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”), a wholly-owned subsidiary
of LBHI, also filed for chapter 11 protection.177
LBSF conducted a large number of derivative trades.178 It had open
derivative trades with thousands of counterparties as of the LBHI Petition
Date.179 Most, if not all, of these trades were documented under ISDA Master

172 Robin Sidel et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, as Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis: Ailing
Firm Sold for Just $2 a Share in U.S.-Backed Deal, WALL ST. J., March 17, 2008,
www.online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120569598608739825.
173 Charlie Gasparino, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch for $50 Billion, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2008, 7:42
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708319.
174 Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy Case as Suitors Balk,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2008, 9:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
awh5hRyXkvs4.
175 Id. At that time, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch were the three largest investment
banking firms in the United States. See Katy Marquardt, FAQ on Investment Banks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (March 17, 2008, 4:01 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2008/03/17/
faq-on-investment-banks.
176 Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008, 10:07 AM), http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/0/52098fa2-82e3-11dd-907e-000077b07658.html#axzz2zlmP9K3F. Administration is a formal
insolvency proceeding in the United Kingdom that is similar to a bankruptcy filing in the United States. See
John Armour et al., Symposium, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law:
Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 1742–50 (2002).
177 The chapter 11 bankruptcy filings of LBHI and its affiliates were the largest chapter 11 bankruptcy
filings in history. Onaran & Scinta, supra note 174.
178 See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, Vol. 2, at 569, 572, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No.
08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), ECF No. 7531-2, available at https://jenner.com/lehman (last
visited June 20, 2015).
179 See id.
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Agreements.180 LBHI acted as Guarantor for virtually all of LBSF’s ISDA
Master Agreements with its counterparties.181
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceedings have given rise to several
decisions of first impression and produced important decisions regarding the
relationship between the ISDA Master Agreement and the statutory Safe
Harbors in the Code. Some of those decisions are discussed below (along with
some unrelated, earlier decisions) to highlight the need for amending the Safe
Harbors as this Article proposes. Specifically, the decisions address the issues
in enforcement of the following provisions in bankruptcy proceedings:
Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip Clauses, and Triangular
Setoff Clauses.
A. Payment Suspension Clauses: The Metavante Matter, “First Method,” and
Section 2(a)(iii)182
1. Facts and Arguments of Metavante and LBSF
The Metavante matter involved the following set of facts: Metavante and
LBSF entered into an interest rate swap document under an ISDA Master
Agreement.183 LBHI guaranteed LBSF’s obligations thereunder.184 Under the
terms of the interest rate swap, the parties agreed to pay whichever of them
was in the money on a net basis on agreed upon quarterly Reset Dates.185
Recall that LBSF filed for chapter 11 protection twenty-two days after
LBHI.186 Both of those bankruptcy filings qualified as an Event of Default
180 See Solomon Noh, Lesson from Lehman Brothers for Hedge Fund Managers: The Effect of a
Bankruptcy Filing on the Value of the Debtor’s Derivative Book, HEDGE FUND L. REP., July 12, 2012,
available at http://www.shearman.com/en/ (search “Lesson from Lehman”; then follow hyperlink to article)
(last visited June 20, 2015) (stating that most of Lehman’s derivative transactions were documents under the
ISDA Master Agreement).
181 Thus, LBHI was LBSF’s Credit Support Provider. See Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp.
Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)
182 The author previously published an article that presented a detailed discussion of the Metavante
Matter. See generally Peter Marchetti, The Ruling in the Lehman Metavante Matter—Has the Ticking Time
Bomb of Enron vs. TXU Exploded or Been Defused?, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Feb. 2010, at 1.
Portions of the discussion contained in that article have been included herein as relevant.
183 September 15 Transcript, supra note 48, at 102–03.
184 LBHI was listed as LBSF’s “Credit Support Provider” in the ISDA Schedule. Id. at 103.
185 Under this interest rate swap, LBSF was the “floating rate payer” and Metavante was the “fixed rate
payer.” See Marchetti, supra note 182, at 6 (describing the facts of the Metavante matter); see also INT’L
SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2006 ISDA DEFINITIONS 6 (2006).
186 Supra text accompanying notes 174 & 177.
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under the ISDA Master Agreement and would have allowed Metavante to
terminate the interest rate swap.187 If Metavante did terminate at that time, it
would have owed LBSF a large termination payment, because Metavante was
out of the money.188 Metavante refused to terminate the swap.189 Instead,
Metavante relied on the Payment Suspension Clause, refusing to make the
quarterly payments that it owed to LBSF.190 Metavante believed that it could
withhold the payments that were otherwise due and payable to LBSF and that
it could wait for the value of the swap to swing back to a point where
Metavante would be in the money.191
LBSF sought to compel Metavante to make those scheduled payments and
made the following three arguments. First, the interest rate swap was an
executory contract under the Code, and even though LBSF committed an
Event of Default under the ISDA Master Agreement by filing for bankruptcy,
Metavante still had to perform its payment obligations thereunder until LBSF
decided whether to assume or reject the ISDA Master Agreement. Second, the
Safe Harbors did not permit Metavante to withhold payments that were
otherwise due and owing to LBSF. It would, however, have allowed Metavante
to terminate, liquidate, and accelerate the interest rate swap and to set-off or to
net out amounts owed under those terminated transactions upon the bankruptcy
filing of LBSF or LBHI. Finally, the Safe Harbors did not allow Metavante to
“ride the market” by withholding the payments that were otherwise due and
payable to LBSF and by waiting for the value of the swap to swing back to a
point where Metavante would be in the money.192
Metavante, however, first argued that LBSF and LBHI’s chapter 11
bankruptcy filings were two different and distinct Events of Default under the
ISDA Master Agreement, and Metavante could withhold payments under the
Payment Suspension Clause based on LBHI’s bankruptcy filing, not LBSF’s
187 Metavante could have terminated the ISDA Master Agreement along with any transactions falling
thereunder (including the interest rate swap) pursuant to section 6(a) of the ISDA Master Agreement and
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 560 (2012). September 15 Transcript, supra note 48, at 108–09.
188 See Marchetti, supra note 182, at 6.
189 See September 15 Transcript, supra note 48, at 106.
190 See id. at 103–04, 109. Metavante refused to make three quarterly payments to LBSF that totaled
approximately $6.6 million. Id. at 103.
191 See id. at 110. Metavante was “riding the market” waiting for the value of the swap to swing back to a
value favorable to Metavante. See id.
192 See id. at 101-13; Debtor’s Motion Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 362 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
to Compel Performance of Metavante Corp.’s Obligations Under an Executory Contract and to Enforce the
Automatic Stay at 7–12, In re Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2009), ECF No.
3691; Marchetti, supra note 182, at 6–7 (detailing arguments made by LBSF).
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bankruptcy filing.193 Second, Metavante argued that under the Safe Harbors,
Metavante could terminate the ISDA Master Agreement at any time it desired
to do so.194
2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision
The bankruptcy court, ruling on this issue of first impression under U.S.
law, ultimately sided with LBSF and held the following: (1) Section 2(a)(iii)
was a non-enforceable ipso facto clause under § 365(e)(1) and would not
permit an out-of-the-money Non-defaulting Party to withhold payments
otherwise due and payable to a Debtor under a swap agreement based on the
Debtor’s (or its Guarantor’s) status as a debtor under the Code; and (2) a Nondefaulting Party waives its right to terminate the ISDA Master Agreement if it
does not promptly terminate following the bankrupt counterparty’s (or its
Guarantor’s) bankruptcy filing.195 Likewise, the court held that Metavante
violated the automatic stay by relying on section 2(a)(iii) to withhold payments
that were otherwise due and payable to LBSF under a swap agreement on the
quarterly Reset Dates.196
Metavante later appealed the ruling, but before the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York decided the appeal, Metavante and LBSF
entered into a settlement.197
193

See Objection of Metavante Corp. to Debtor’s Motion, Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, to Compel Performance of Obligations Under an Executory Contract and to Enforce the
Automatic Stay at 5–11, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555, ECF No. 3951.
194 See id. at 5–6. Metavante also made other arguments in support of its position. See Marchetti, supra
note 182, at 6–7 (detailing arguments advanced by LBSF and Metavante).
195 September 15 Transcript, supra note 48, at 101, 113. The court did note that the Safe Harbors allow
certain parties to derivative contracts to “exercise certain limited contractual rights triggered by a chapter 11
bankruptcy filing.” Id. at 107. The court said, however, that the Code provides such parties those rights “only
to the extent that the non-debtor party seeks to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate its contracts or net out its
positions.” Id. (emphasis added). See Marchetti, supra note 182, at 7–8 (providing a detailed description of the
bankruptcy court’s ruling in the Metavante matter).
196 September 15 Transcript, supra note 48, at 112–13. The bankruptcy court stated that “Metavante’s
attempts to control LBSF’s right to receive payment under the [ISDA Master] Agreement constitute, in effect,
an attempt to control property of the estate.” Id. at 112. The bankruptcy court further stated that “contract
rights are property of the estate . . .” Id.
197 See Order Granting Debtors’ Motion for Approval of a Settlement Agreement with Metavante Corp.,
In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 15, 2010), ECF No. 8336; Debtors’
Motion for Approval of a Settlement Agreement with Metavante Corp., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No.
08-13555 (Mar. 24, 2010), ECF No. 7780; Declaration of Daniel Ehrmann in Support of Debtors’ Motion for
Approval of a Settlement Agreement with Metavante Corp., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555
(Mar. 24, 2010), ECF No. 7781; Order Remanding Appeal of Metavante Corp., Metavante Corp. v. Lehman
Bros. Holdings, Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 09-09839 (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 2010).
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3. Implications of the Metavante Matter
Although the Metavante matter provided some clarity on the enforceability
of section 2(a)(iii),198 a lack of clarity remains in the bankruptcy context with
respect to several issues, which the author discussed in a previous work.199
Other than those issues, the ruling does not provide an in-depth analysis of
whether a Non-defaulting Party like Metavante could withhold payments to a
chapter 11 Debtor based not on that debtor’s bankruptcy filing, but on the
bankruptcy filing of its Guarantor or one of its affiliates. Although the court
addressed this issue in two later cases involving Flip Clauses, it glossed over
the issue here.200
B. Walkaway Clauses
Recall that, notwithstanding section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master
Agreement, parties sometimes insert a Walkaway Clause into the Schedule or a
Confirmation, and it completely excuses a Non-defaulting Party from making a
payment that would be otherwise due and payable to a Defaulting Party,
regardless of whether the Event of Default resulted from the Debtor’s
bankruptcy filing or the bankruptcy filing of one of its affiliates.201 While there
are no reported decisions that expressly hold whether a Walkaway Clause is
enforceable in the derivatives context against a chapter 11 debtor, two notable
cases have addressed this issue.

198

See Marchetti, supra note 182, at 15–17.
See id. (discussing issues remaining after the ruling in the Metavante matter). One of the major
unresolved issues following the ruling in the Metavante matter is the exact time period within which a Nondefaulting Party must terminate an ISDA Master Agreement to be deemed to have acted “promptly.” Id. at 17.
To remedy that uncertainty, Congress should amend the Code so that market participants know the exact
window of time within which they must act to be deemed to have terminated an ISDA Master Agreement
“promptly.” Id. Indeed, one bankruptcy court noted that a Non-defaulting Party properly exercised its right to
terminate when it did so within a seven-week time frame. See In re Mirant Corp., 314 B.R. 347, 349–53
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).
200 See infra Part III.C. (discussing BNY).
201 See supra Part I.B.2.e. Depending on how a court interprets section 2(a)(iii), a court could interpret
section 2(a)(iii) as a Walkaway Clause in addition to interpreting it as a Payment Suspension Clause. See
Mertens, supra note 98, at 234–35, 253, 263; Jeremy D. Weinstein et al., Escape from the Island of One-Way
Termination: Expectations and Enron v. TXU, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2004, at 1, 4–5. One
such interpretation is that under section 2(a)(iii), a Non-defaulting Party’s obligation is indefinitely suspended
for so long as an Event of Default exists. See Mertens, supra note 98, at 252–53. Under section 5(a)(vii)(4)(B)
of the ISDA Master Agreement, any bankruptcy case that lasts more than thirty days may not be a “curable”
event of default. See Weinstein et al., supra, at 4–5.
199
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1. Drexel
In 1991, the case of Drexel Burnham Lambert Products Corp. v. Midland
Bank P.L.C., arose from the chapter 11 filing of Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group Inc. and many of its affiliates.202 Drexel involved the following facts:
Midland Bank P.L.C. (“Midland”) and Drexel Burnham Lambert Products
(“Drexel Products”) entered into an interest rate swap.203 Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group (“Drexel Group”) guaranteed Drexel Products’ obligations to
Midland under the interest rate swap agreement.204 The interest rate swap
agreement contained a Walkaway Clause.205
Drexel Group filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which trigged an
Event of Default under the swap agreement.206 As a result, the interest rate
swap terminated.207 Drexel Group alleged that it was owed $373,000 upon the
swap’s termination.208 Midland refused to pay.209 A dispute then arose between
Drexel Group and Midland as to whether the Walkaway Clause was
enforceable.210 Drexel Group argued that it was not enforceable and sought to
recover the $373,000 termination payment on the grounds of unjust
enrichment.211
Midland, on the other hand, argued that the Walkaway Clause was
enforceable because it did not qualify as a penalty clause. It further noted that
an equitable remedy such as unjust enrichment was not available to a
202 No. 92-3098, 1992 WL 12633422, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1992). Aside from certain fraud issues
involved in Drexel’s downfall, Drexel’s business model, in many ways, could be compared to the investment
banks involved in the financial crisis. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35
J. CORP. L. 469, 477–81 (2010) (discussing Drexel).
203 Drexel, 1992 WL 12633422, at *1–2. This agreement was not documented under an ISDA Master
Agreement. Midland and Drexel Burnham Government Securities, Inc. (“Drexel GSI”) were the initial parties
to this interest rate swap agreement. Id. Midland and Drexel GSI executed the interest rate swap agreement on
April 17, 1986. Id. About sixteen months later, on August 14, 1987, Drexel GSI assigned the swap agreement
to Drexel Products. Id.
204 Id. Thus, Drexel Group would qualify as Drexel GSI’s Guarantor if this swap agreement was drafted
under an ISDA Master Agreement. See 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 14.
205 See Drexel, 1992 WL 12633422, at *3–4. The Walkaway Clause took the form of a “Limited TwoWay Payment Clause,” which is similar to the First Method contained in the 1987 ISDA Agreement and in the
1992 ISDA Master Agreement. Id. at *2.
206 Id. at *3.
207 See id. at *3–4; see also Complaint at 4–5, Drexel, 1992 WL 12633422 (No. 92-3098) [hereinafter
Drexel Complaint].
208 See Drexel Complaint, supra note 207, at 5.
209 See id.
210 See generally id.
211 Id.
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sophisticated party like Drexel Group, which drafted the contract containing
the Walkaway Clause, the consequences of which Drexel Group was
attempting to avoid after its own breach.212
In an unpublished decision, the Drexel court held in favor of Midland.213
The court upheld the Walkaway Clause on the grounds that, among other
things, it qualified as a valid liquidated damages clause, was not contrary to
public policy, and did not constitute forfeiture or result in unjust enrichment to
Midland.214
It is important to note that in Drexel, it seemed that Drexel Products, like
its Guarantor, Drexel Group, was in bankruptcy proceedings around the time
Midland attempted to enforce the Walkaway Clause. However, neither the
Drexel complaint nor any of the pleadings in the Drexel case made any
reference to § 365 or § 541, which invalidate ipso facto clauses such as the
Walkaway Clause at issue in that case, when a party seeks to enforce such a
clause against a Debtor.215 Likewise, the Drexel opinion failed to even
mention, let alone analyze, ipso facto clauses or § 365 or § 541 of the Code.216
If this analysis were applied to a Non-defaulting Party seeking to enforce a
Walkaway Clause against a chapter 11 debtor based solely upon that Debtor’s
bankruptcy filing, a bankruptcy court would most likely hold that such a clause
is an unenforceable ipso facto clause because it would operate to deprive a
chapter 11 debtor of a valuable asset—its contractual right to payment.217

212 See generally Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim by Midland Bank, P.L.C., Drexel, 1992 WL
12633422 (No. 92-3098) [hereinafter Midland Answer]. Midland was essentially saying that Drexel was
estopped from arguing that the Walkaway Clause was unenforceable, because Drexel drafted the swap
agreement and imposed its terms on Midland. Id. at 4.
213 Drexel, 1992 WL 12633422, at *4.
214 See id. at *3–4.
215 See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 743–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(discussing Drexel affiliates that filed for chapter 11 protection). See generally Drexel Complaint, supra note
207; Midland Answer, supra note 212; Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment,
Drexel, 1992 WL 12633422; Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its Complaint, Drexel, 1992 WL 12633422 (No. 92-3098).
216 See generally Drexel, 1992 WL 12633422.
217 Indeed, as some commentators have noted, the Drexel decision did not cite any supporting precedent,
did not contain an extensive analysis of the conclusion it reached, and is of “dubious precedential value.” Craig
R. Enochs et al., Early Termination and Liquidation Provisions as Risk Tools in Master Energy Agreements,
JACKSON WALKER L.L.P. 9 n.25 (Nov. 2, 2004), http://images.jw.com/com/publications/419.pdf. Depending
on the facts involved, outside of formal bankruptcy proceedings where the Code’s prohibitions on ipso facto
clauses do not apply, a Payment Suspension Clause or Walkaway Clause may be enforceable under state
contract law. See Brookfield Asset Mgmt. v. AIG Fin. Prod. Corp., No. 09-cv-8285(PGG), 2010 WL 3910590
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2. Harrier Dispute
A recent dispute in the Lehman chapter 11 proceedings between LBSF and
Harrier Finance Limited (“Harrier”) also centered on the enforceability of a
Walkaway Clause in the context of chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.218 That
dispute involved the following facts.219 In July 2005, LBSF entered into a
credit default swap documented under an ISDA Master Agreement with a
structured investment vehicle called the Racers Trust.220 The sole beneficiary
of the Racers Trust was Harrier.221 According to the terms of the credit default
swap transaction, the Racers Trust acted as a “protection seller,” and LBSF
acted as a “protection buyer” with respect to twelve financial institutions.222
If certain events occurred with respect to any one of those twelve financial
institutions that would adversely affect the financial condition of one or more
of them, the Racers Trust, as protection seller, would have to pay LBSF, as
protection buyer, a large sum of money.223 In 2005, LBSF paid the Racers
Trust approximately $4.5 million to purchase this credit protection.224 Thus,
these payments were analogous to the payment of an insurance premium

at *15–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (declining to dismiss suit based on assertion that Walkaway Clause
constituted an unenforceable penalty clause under applicable state contract law).
218 See Harrier Complaint, supra note 104, ¶ 21 (describing the Walkaway Clause used in credit default
swap transaction).
219 These are the allegations contained in the Complaint. See generally id. An answer was not filed in this
dispute.
220 See id. ¶¶ 1–2. The name of the Racers Trust was the Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced
Returns, Series 2005-13-C Trust.
221 See id. ¶ 1. The Racers Trust was a Structured Investment Vehicle (“SIV”). Basically, Harrier gave
money to Racers Trust in exchange for beneficial interests therein. See id. ¶ 19. In turn, the Racers Trust
invested that money in AAA rated assets with “a par amount of $300 million.” Id. If a “credit event” did not
occur before the scheduled termination date of the credit default swap, September 20, 2010, the Racers Trust
would turn over any “cash from the matured AAA-rated assets and the upfront payment” of approximately
$4.5 million LBSF made to the Racers Trust in 2005. Id. Harrier, however, could lose the money it invested in
the SIV if one or more credit events took place with respect to one of the twelve financial institutions
referenced in the credit default swap. Id.
222 See id. ¶ 2. These were all large institutions, such as American Express, Citigroup, Inc., The Goldman
Sachs Group, JP Morgan Chase & Co., and Merrill Lynch & Co. Id. ¶ 19. Under the ISDA Credit Derivative
Definitions, these entities that are subject to the credit default swap are referred to as “Reference Entities.” See
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVE DEFINITIONS § 2.1 (2003).
223 Harrier Complaint, supra note 104, ¶ 2. These events are generally referred to as “Credit Events.” See
Harrier Complaint, supra note 104, ¶ 19; 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 5(b)(v).
According to the Harrier Complaint, the sum the Racers Trust owed to LBSF was “up to $25 million . . . (for a
total potential payment obligation of $300 million).” Harrier Complaint, supra note 104, ¶ 2.
224 See Harrier Complaint, supra note 104, ¶ 3.
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because, after making these payments, LBSF did not have any more payment
obligations to the Racers Trust under the credit default swap.225
On October 1, 2008—two days before the LBSF Petition Date—the Racers
Trust terminated the credit default swap based on LBHI’s bankruptcy filing.226
Like the derivative transaction in the Metavante matter, both the LBHI Petition
Date and the LBSF Petition Date qualified as Events of Default under the
ISDA Master Agreement.227 Approximately four months after the Racers Trust
terminated the credit default swap, the trustee of the Racers Trust “distributed
substantially all of the Racers Trust’s assets” to Harrier and did not pay any
amounts to LBSF.228
LBSF claimed that Harrier, which received all of the assets of the Racers
Trust, owed it a termination amount of approximately $55 million as a result of
the Racers Trust’s election to terminate the credit default swap.229 Harrier, on
the other hand, refused to pay LBSF any amount based on a Walkaway Clause
contained in the ISDA Schedule.230 In support of its argument, Harrier cited to
Drexel.231 Harrier argued that the Walkaway Clause did not qualify as an ipso
facto clause because Harrier terminated the credit default swap based on
LBHI’s bankruptcy filing, not LBSF’s bankruptcy filing, and Harrier sent the
termination to LBSF before LBSF filed for bankruptcy.232
225

See id. ¶¶ 4–5, 20.
See id. ¶¶ 4, 26. According to the Harrier Complaint, the Racers Trust “terminated the credit default
swap . . . based solely on the prior Chapter 11 filing of LBHI.” Id. at ¶ 4. The Racers Trust designated October
6, 2008, as the early termination date of the credit default swap. Id. at ¶ 26.
227 See id. ¶ 21. LBHI was listed as LBSF’s “credit support provider” in the ISDA Master Agreement
between the parties, even though LBSF already fully paid all amounts it owed to the Racers Trust under the
credit default swap. See id.
228 See id. ¶ 4. According to the Harrier Complaint, those assets consisted of approximately $145 million
in cash and approximately $155 million worth of AAA-rated securities. Id.
229 See id. LBSF alleged that even though a credit event did not occur with respect to any of the Reference
Entities, “the risk of one or more” of them experiencing a credit event increased the value of the credit default
swap to LBSF. Id. ¶¶ 4, 22.
230 See id. ¶ 24. The Walkaway Clause provided as follows: “[I]n the event [LBSF] is the Defaulting Party
or Affected Party under the terms of this Agreement, no termination payments shall be paid by either party and
[the Trustee] shall deliver to the holders of each Series of Certificates, pro rata, the Underlying Securities held
by [the Trustee].” Id.
231 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 9–10, Lehman Bros.
Special Fin. Inc. v. Harrier Fin. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros Holdings Inc.), No. 09-01241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June
22, 2009), ECF No. 9.
232 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 10, Harrier
Fin. Ltd., No. 09-01241 (Sept. 16, 2009), ECF No. 19. Although the termination notice was sent before
LBSF’s bankruptcy, it designated a termination date that fell on a day approximately three days after LBSF’s
bankruptcy. Id. at 9–10.
226
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LBSF argued that the Walkaway Clause was not enforceable, because it
qualified as an ipso facto clause.233 LBSF claimed that it did not matter
whether the bankruptcy filing of LBHI or LBSF triggered the Walkaway
Clause because §§ 541 and 365 invalidate ipso facto clauses that are triggered
by “the commencement of a [bankruptcy] case,” not the debtor’s bankruptcy
case.234 Similar to its argument in the Metavante matter, LBSF also argued that
the Safe Harbors did not permit the Racers Trust to completely “walkaway”
from its payment obligations that, absent the Walkaway Clause, would have
been due and owing to LBSF.235
Before the bankruptcy court issued a decision, LBSF agreed to dismiss the
case, most likely as a result of a settlement between the parties.236 For the
reasons discussed above, it seems somewhat clear a Walkaway Clause would
not be enforceable where a non-defaulting, non-debtor party sought to enforce
such a clause against a chapter 11 debtor based solely upon that chapter 11
debtor’s bankruptcy filing.237 Harrier, however, presented a situation where a
non-debtor, Non-defaulting Party sought to enforce such a clause against a
chapter 11 debtor based not only on that debtor’s bankruptcy filing, but on the
previous filing of its parent company, and on the fact that the termination
notice was sent to the debtor-subsidiary prior to its filing.

233 See Harrier Complaint, supra note 104, ¶¶ 33–34. LBSF also argued that the Walkaway Clause: (1)
qualified as an unenforceable penalty clause that would cause it to suffer a forfeiture and allow Harrier to be
unjustly enriched; and (2) the Walkaway Clause effectuated a fraudulent conveyance to Harrier. Id. See
generally Plaintiff Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc.’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Harrier
Fin. Ltd., No. 09-01241 (July 22, 2009), ECF No. 15. In that Motion, LBSF argued that the Drexel decision
was “an unpublished opinion devoid of any substantive analysis.” Id. at 12. With respect to the issue as to
whether the Walkaway Clause qualified as an unenforceable penalty clause, LBSF argued that Drexel was
distinguishable from LBSF’s dispute with Harrier because the amount in dispute in Drexel was approximately
$373,000, while the amount in dispute with Harrier was significantly larger—approximately $55 million. Id.
234 See Plaintiff Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc.’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 233, at 13–15 (emphasis added).
235 See id. at 15. Instead, LBSF argued that the Safe Harbors would have simply allowed the Racers Trust
to terminate, liquidate, and accelerate derivative transactions and to set off or net out amounts owed under
those terminated transactions upon the bankruptcy filing of LBSF or LBHI. Id. at 15–16.
236 The court issued an order requiring Harrier and other similarly-situated parties to submit to mandatory,
non-binding alternative dispute resolution. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Order for
Affirmative Claims of the Debtors Under Derivatives Transactions with Special Purpose Vehicle
Counterparties, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011), ECF No.
14789. The court ordered that the amounts of any payments and any other economic terms resulting from any
of the settlements reached pursuant to the procedures prescribed in the ADR Order be kept strictly
confidential. Id. at 22–23. Therefore, whether Harrier paid LBSF any sums of money to settle the matter is not
public knowledge. See id.
237 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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C. Flip Clauses: BNY
Perhaps the most controversial decision arising from the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy proceedings was the bankruptcy court’s decision involving a matter
of first impression in Lehman Bros. Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate
Trustee Services (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.) (“BNY”).238 In BNY, the
bankruptcy court held that a Flip Clause contained in certain transaction
documents associated with a CDO transaction was not enforceable because it
qualified as an unenforceable ipso facto clause.239 This case is significant
because the court did not allow a non-debtor, Non-defaulting Party to enforce
an ipso facto clause against a Debtor where enforcement was based on the
bankruptcy filing of an entity affiliated with the Debtor, and not based on the
Debtor’s own bankruptcy filing.240 The case is also significant because the
bankruptcy court reached a conclusion completely opposite of an English
court’s reading of the same facts.241 Accordingly, the English court’s decision
could be persuasive authority for a U.S. bankruptcy court in a district other
than the Southern District of New York, or for any higher court in the U.S.,
that confronts the issue of whether an ipso facto clause is enforceable against a
Debtor where the enforcement is based on the bankruptcy filing of an entity
affiliated with the Debtor, and not based on the Debtor’s own filing.
BNY involved the following facts. In a transaction governed by English
law, BNY was a party to a Principal Trust Deed (which is similar to an
indenture in the United States) with Dante Finance Public Limited Company
associated with the Dante Programme, a multi-issuer secured obligation
program.242 As part of the structure of the transaction, Lehman Brothers
International (Europe) established an SPV named Saphir that sold secured
238 Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422
B.R. 407, 418–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). See generally Jones et al., supra note 39 (discussing decision as
controversial); David B. Stratton & Michael J. Custer, Shot Heard Around the CDO World: Flip Clauses
Found to Be Unenforceable Ipso Facto Provisions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2010, at 30; Nicole Bullock &
Anousha Sakoui, Lehman SPV Ruling Sparks Controversy, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.
FT.com (click in the box to the right of “Subscribe” then search “Lehman SPV Ruling Sparks Controversy”)
(“It is a controversial ruling which will be closely scrutinized for its implications for the structured products
and derivatives markets.”). Previously, the author published a short article regarding implications of BNY that
are not set forth herein. See Marchetti, supra note 117, at 14. Portions of that article regarding the facts and
background of BNY appear herein as they are important to the proposals made in this Article.
239 BNY, 422 B.R. at 418–19.
240 See id. at 420. Later, the bankruptcy court reached the same conclusion in a dispute between LBSF and
Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007—1 Limited. See Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007—1
Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 452 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
241 See infra Part III.C.1.
242 BNY, 422 B.R. at 413.
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notes to various investors.243 Perpetual Trustee Company Limited bought two
series of the notes.244 Various transaction documents governed the notes.245
As part of the overall transaction, LBSF entered into swap agreements with
Dante.246 Those swaps fell under an ISDA Master Agreement between the
parties.247 In its role as trustee, BNY held collateral for Saphir’s creditors.248
Both Perpetual and LBSF were creditors of Saphir.249 The transaction
documents contained a waterfall provision that provided that Saphir would pay
any and all amounts owed to LBSF, as its swap counterparty, before making
any payments owed to Perpetual, as noteholder.250 The waterfall provision
contained a Flip Clause that provided that this priority of payment scheme
would be flipped if LBSF triggered an Event of Default under the ISDA
Master Agreement.251 Under the Flip Clause, if an Event of Default occurred
under the ISDA Master Agreement between LBSF and Saphir, Saphir would
have to pay any and all amount it owed to Perpetual before paying any
amounts Saphir owed to LBSF.252
After its bankruptcy filing, LBSF contacted BNY and stated that the Flip
Clause contained in the transaction documents was not enforceable.253 Shortly
thereafter, Saphir sent LBSF a termination notice that terminated the parties’
ISDA Master.254 Under the transaction documents, the termination of the ISDA
Master Agreement triggered Saphir’s obligation to redeem the notes.255
1. The English Court Proceeding and Decision
Concerned that there was not sufficient collateral to fully pay the amounts
Saphir owed to Perpetual and LBSF, Perpetual commenced an action in the
High Court of Justice, Chancery Division (“High Court”) seeking clarity as to

243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 413–14.
Id.
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the enforceability of the Flip Clause.256 Shortly thereafter, while the English
litigation was occurring, LBSF commenced an adversary proceeding in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York against BNY
(the “New York Litigation”).257 LBSF sought, inter alia, a declaration that the
Flip Clause qualified as an unenforceable ipso facto clause under §§ 365 and
541.258 LBSF filed a summary judgment motion in support of the arguments
advanced in its complaint in the New York Litigation.259 Later, BNY filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment in the New York Litigation.260
The High Court held in favor of Perpetual and held that the Flip Clause was
enforceable.261 Specifically, it held that the Flip Clause did not violate the
“anti-deprivation principle” under English law because the Flip Clause took
effect on September 15, 2008—the LBHI Petition Date, which occurred before
the LBSF Petition Date.262 In support of this holding, the High Court stated
that the LBHI Petition Date triggered the Flip Clause, not the LBSF Petition
Date, because LBHI was LBSF’s Guarantor, and a Guarantor’s bankruptcy
filing is an Event of Default under the ISDA Master Agreement.263
2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision
In diametric opposition to the English Court, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York in the New York Litigation held that the
Flip Clause was not enforceable because it was an unenforceable ipso facto

256 See id. at 410–11; see also Complaint at 7, Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs.
Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2010) (No. 1:09-AP-01242).
257 BNY, 422 B.R. at 411.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 412.
261 Id. at 411.
262 Id. The anti-deprivation principle provides that “there cannot be a valid contract that a man’s property
shall remain his until bankruptcy, and on the happening of that event go over to someone else, and be taken
from his creditors.” Perpetual Tr. Co. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd., [2009] EWHC (Ch) 1912, [2009] 2 BCLC
400 (Eng.). The ipso facto provisions of the Code seem to provide broader protections to a chapter 11 debtor
because they prevent, inter alia, any modification of any rights of a debtor in an executory contract or a
debtor’s interest in property, based on the commencement of a bankruptcy case or based on the financial
condition of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(1), 541(c)(1)(B) (2012).
263 Perpetual Tr. Co., [2009] EWHC (Ch) 1912. LBSF filed an appeal of the High Court’s decision to the
Court of Appeal, Civil Division (the “Court of Appeal” and, together with the High Court, the “UK Courts”).
Id. at 412. Before summary judgment briefing concluded in the New York Litigation, the Court of Appeal
issued a decision upholding the High Court’s decision. Id. See generally Perpetual Tr. Co. v. BNY Corp. Tr.
Servs. Ltd., [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1160, [2010] Ch 347 (Eng.).
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clause.264 Furthermore, again, in diametric opposition to the English Court, the
bankruptcy court stated that the LBSF Petition Date, and not the LBHI Petition
Date, triggered the Flip Clause.265
a. The Case or “a Case”
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court stated that, under the Code, it did not
matter whether the LBHI Petition Date or the LBSF Petition Date triggered the
Flip Clause, because it was an unenforceable ipso facto clause.266 The court
further stated that the Lehman debtors’ different corporate entities comprised
an “integrated enterprise” and that “the financial condition of one [Lehman]
affiliate affects the others.”267 The court acknowledged that it took a novel
approach in concluding that the separate bankruptcy filings of LBSF and
LBHI, which occurred on different dates, but in close proximity to each other,
constituted a singular event for purposes of §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B).268
The bankruptcy court stated that the plain language of §§ 365(e)(1) and
264 BNY, 422 B.R. at 414–15. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court stated that §§ 365 and 541 of the Code
nullify ipso facto clauses. Id.
265 Id. at 418. Through the court’s interpretation of those documents, it reasoned that although an Event of
Default may have occurred under the Swap Agreements as a result of LBHI’s bankruptcy filing, that Event of
Default, under the Transaction Documents, was not sufficient by itself to effectuate the Flip Clause. Id.
Instead, the court found that pursuant to the terms of the Transaction Documents, Noteholder Priority would be
triggered only when amounts were paid “in connection with the realization or enforcement of the [Collateral].”
Id. The court noted that, as of the LBSF Petition Date, the Collateral had not been sold. Id.
266 Id. The court pointed to §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B). Id.
267 Id. at 419. In an different bankruptcy decision that did not involve derivatives, Judge Peck, the
bankruptcy judge that issued the Bench Ruling in the Metavante matter and also wrote the BNY decision, made
a similar holding regarding a cross default clause triggered by the bankruptcy filing of a Debtor’s affiliate. See
In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221, 250–51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). There, the court stated that: “[The
Debtor] is an integrated enterprise, and the financial condition of one affiliate affects the others.” Id. at 251.
268 BNY, 422 B.R. at 422. The court stated: “No case has ever declared that the operative bankruptcy filing
is not limited to the commencement of a bankruptcy case by the debtor-counterparty itself but may be a case
filed by a related entity.” Id. The court also acknowledged:

[T]here is an element of commercial expectation that underlies the subordination argument.
LBSF was instrumental in the development and marketing of the complex financial structures
that are now being reviewed from a bankruptcy perspective. The Court assumes that a bankruptcy
affecting any of the Lehman Entities was viewed a highly remote contingency at the time that the
Transaction Documents were being prepared. At that time, LBSF agreed to a subordination of its
Swap Counterparty Priority in the hard-to-imagine event that it should be in default at some time
in the future. Capital was committed with this concept embedded in the transaction. But the ipso
facto protections of sections 365 and 541 of the Bankruptcy Code apply uniformly, regardless of
market expectations. They exist and should be enforced to preserve property interests for the
benefit of all creditor constituencies.
Id. at 422 n.9.
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541(c)(1)(B) forbids any modification of a debtor’s contractual right in an
executory contract based on an ipso facto clause triggered by the filing of “a
case under this title.”269 The court reasoned that it was “convinced that the
chapter 11 cases of LBHI and its affiliates is a single event for purposes of
interpreting the ipso facto language” contained in §§ 365(e)(1) and
541(c)(1)(B).270
The bankruptcy court noted that the plain meaning of §§ 365(e)(1) and
541(c)(1)(B) presumably applies to the commencement of any bankruptcy case
“that is related in some appropriate manner to the contracting parties”271 and
stated:
If the words are not tied to the case filed by the particular debtor that
is a party to a specified executory contract, under what circumstances
is the bankruptcy case of another debtor sufficiently related to rights
of the parties to such an executory contract that is reasonable to
trigger the ipso facto protections of these sections? Opening up the
subject to cases filed by debtors other than the counterparty itself has
the potential of opening up a proverbial “can of worms” that may
lead to speculation as to the nature and degree of the relationship
between debtors that is needed in order to properly apply the
provision.272

269

Id. at 419.
Id. at 420. The court then analyzed the legislative history of §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) and noted
that the early versions of those sections contained language that proscribed modification of a debtor’s
contractual right in an executory contract based on a contractual provision in an agreement conditioned upon
the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, but that Congress later rejected that language in favor of the broader language,
currently found in the Code, which proscribes any modification of a debtor’s contractual right in an executory
contract based on a provision in an agreement conditioned upon a bankruptcy filing. Id. at 418–19. The court
stated:
270

The legislative history of section 365(e)(1) and section 541(c)(1)(B) provides helpful guidance in
understanding the meaning of these sections and in analyzing how to interpret the words “a case”
used in these sections. An early version of what eventually became section 365(e)(1) referred to
the “commencement of a case under this Act by or against the debtor.” Similarly, a draft of the
language that became section 541(c)(1) at one time referred to “the commencement of a case
under this title concerning the debtor.” This initial use and later rejection of limiting language
demonstrates that Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, drafting sections 365(e)(1) and
541(c)(1)(B) in a manner that would have expressly restricted their application to the bankruptcy
case of the debtor counterparty.
Id. at 419 (citations omitted). The court stated that although the language “commencement of a case under this
title” seems straightforward at first blush, “what has been left out raises a number of questions.” Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
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The bankruptcy court stated that this language could be construed in a
manner that renders “multiple subsidiaries under common control sufficiently
related” to each other as to trigger the ipso facto protections set forth in
§§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B).273 The bankruptcy court further stated that an
additional possibility is that a court might deem a Debtor and its Guarantor “as
sufficiently related to impose ipso facto protections [contained in §§ 365(e)(1)
and 541(c)(1)(B)] if either the principal or the guarantor were to file for
bankruptcy relief.”274
The court then held that the Flip Clause was an unenforceable ipso facto
clause, and that any enforcement of it would violate the automatic stay.275 In
reaching this conclusion, the court did not give market participants an
extensive explanation as to when and in what circumstances the different
bankruptcy filings of a Debtor and an affiliated Guarantor would qualify as a
singular event for purposes of §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B).276
b. Safe Harbors
In its cross-motion for summary judgment, BNY argued that the Flip
Clause was enforceable under the Safe Harbors.277 Construing the Safe
Harbors narrowly, the bankruptcy court rejected this argument and stated that
the Safe Harbors only allow a Non-defaulting Party to a swap agreement with a
bankrupt counterparty to enforce its

273

Id. at 419 n.6.
Id. The court continued, stating: “This opinion identifies these possibilities, but makes no ruling as to
whether any of these relationships is sufficiently close the mandate that the bankruptcy of one debtor entity
necessarily would lead to the protection of property interests of any other entity.” Id. The court acknowledged
that there could be a “potential for future disputes over the interpretation” of the language contained in
§§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B), but “decline[d] . . . to make any broad pronouncements, interpret the language
in the abstract or to expand on the various relationships between or among debtor entities that would make it
appropriate for one debtor to invoke [ipso facto] protection due to the filing of another affiliated member of a
corporate family.” Id. at 419. The court continued to state that the “description of the kind of relationship that
is sufficient to trigger [ipso facto] protections affecting the rights of contracting parties is best left to a case-bycase determination” and with that “principal of restraint in mind” it applied the “a case” language to the LBSF
and LBHI chapter 11 filings. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that: (1) the issues before
it were “unprecedented;” (2) it “was not aware of any other case that . . . construed the ipso facto provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code under [similar] circumstances;” and (3) its decision “may be a controversial one.” Id. at
422.
275 Id. at 419–20.
276 See Stratton & Custer, supra note 238, at 66 (discussing lack of guidance provided by court’s decision
as creating “significant uncertainty with respect to the enforceability in bankruptcy of flip clauses or similar
market-standard subordination provisions in CDO transactions”).
277 BNY, 422 B.R. at 421–22.
274
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contractual rights to (i) liquidate, terminate or accelerate “one or
more swap agreements because of condition [sic] of the kind
specified in [§] 365(e)(1)” or (ii) “offset or net out any termination
values or payment amounts arising under or in connection with the
termination, liquidation, or acceleration of one or more swap
agreements.”278

The bankruptcy court went on to state that the Flip Clause set forth the process
to be used in paying the proceeds flowing from the termination of the ISDA
Master Agreement, but did not “comprise [a] part of [the] swap agreements
themselves.”279 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court stated that § 560 did not
apply to the Flip Clause because § 560 is expressly limited to the “liquidation,
termination or acceleration (not the alteration of rights as they then exist) and
refer[s] specifically to swap agreements.”280
BNY was granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the
bankruptcy court’s decision to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York.281 The parties settled the matter before the U.S. District Court
adjudicated the appeal.282
D. Decisions from Non-U.S. Jurisdictions Dealing with Section 2(a)(iii)
Courts in other countries have addressed section 2(a)(iii). The clause seems
to be enforceable in Australia and in the U.K.283 One of the first cases that
278 Id. at 421–22 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 560 (2012)). The court analyzed the Swap Agreements and noted
that they did not at all reference the Flip Clause. Id.
279 Id. at 421.
280 Id. BNY also argued that the Flip Clause was an enforceable subordination agreement. Id. The
bankruptcy court rejected this argument. Id. at 421–22. Collier on Bankruptcy questions the reasoning of this
decision stating that:

[T]he decision is questionable because (a) the priority-shifting provisions were contained in the
security arrangement for the subject swap agreements and thus, were a swap agreement under the
Bankruptcy Code section 101 (53B)(A)(vi) and (b) the priority-shifting provision were arguably
a liquidation or termination right.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 144, ¶ 560.02.
281 See Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.),
No. 09–01242, 2010 WL 10078354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (granting BNY leave to appeal).
282 See Order Pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Approval of a
Settlement Among Lehman Bros. Special Financing Inc., BNY Corp. Trustee Services Ltd., Perpetual Trustee
Co. Ltd., & Others, Relating to Certain Swap Transactions with Saphir Finance Public Ltd. Co., In re Lehman
Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2010), ECF No. 13511.
283 See, e.g., Enron Austl. Fin. Pty. Ltd v TXU Elec. Ltd. [2003] NSWSC 1169 (Austl.); Lomas v. JFB
Firth Rixson Inc., [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3372, [2011] 2 BCLC 120 (Eng.) (International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc. joined as intervenor).
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seemed to address section 2(a)(iii) was Enron Australia Finance Party Ltd. v.
TXU Electricity Ltd. (the “TXU Case”).284 The TXU Case, however, did not
involve litigation as to whether section 2(a)(iii) was enforceable; rather, in that
case the parties expressly stipulated that section 2(a)(iii) was enforceable under
applicable Australian insolvency law.285
On December 21, 2010, the High Court of Justice in London (the “High
Court”), held in Lomas et al. Together the Joint Administrators of Lehman
Brothers International (Europe) v. JFB Firth Rixson Inc. (“Lomas”) that a
Non-defaulting Party may, in certain circumstances, rely on section 2(a)(iii) of
the ISDA Master Agreement to withhold payments to a defaulting counterparty
that triggered an Event of Default under an ISDA Master Agreement by
entering into formal insolvency proceedings under U.K. law.286 The holding in
Lomas is diametrically opposed to the U.S. bankruptcy courts’ rulings in the
Metavante matter and BNY.
Specifically, the Lomas court held: (1) Section 2(a)(iii) suspends, but does
not extinguish, a Non-defaulting Party’s payment obligation(s) to a Defaulting
Party; (2) this suspended payment obligation lapses on the scheduled
termination date of the relevant swap transaction if at that time an Event of
Default continues to exist; (3) section 2(a)(iii) does not, under certain
circumstances, violate the anti-deprivation principle, which under English law
is similar to, but not as broad as, §§ 365 and 541; (4) section 2(a)(iii) does not
constitute a penalty when a Non-defaulting Party seeks to invoke it upon an
Event of Default with respect to the Defaulting Counterparty; (5) a Nondefaulting Party does not have to decide within a reasonable time period,
whether or when to designate an Early Termination Date with respect to the
bankrupt defaulting counterparty; and (6) a Defaulting Party’s loss of the right
to receive a contingent payment as a result of an Event of Default does not

284

See TXU, [2003] NSWSC 1169.
Id. Instead, the main issues in the TXU case were whether Enron Australia, which caused an Event of
Default under its ISDA Master Agreement with TXU by commencing formal insolvency proceedings under
Australian law and was in the money under that ISDA Master Agreement at that time, could: (1) terminate the
ISDA Master Agreement early, before the scheduled termination date of the last trade documented thereunder;
and (2) force TXU to then pay Enron Australia the Early Termination Amount. Id. TXU prevailed in that
matter. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the TXU case, see Marchetti, supra note 182, at 14–15;
Weinstein, et al., supra note 201, at 6.
286 See Lomas, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3372. Like the Metavante matter, the Lomas case involved a matter of
first impression regarding the enforceability of section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement in the context
of formal U.K. insolvency proceedings. Id.
285
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qualify as a forfeiture or a penalty under U.K. law.287 Moreover, in dicta, the
Lomas court stated that even if section 2(a)(iii) did violate the anti-deprivation
principal, which it did not, section 2(a)(iii) would be enforceable if either: (1)
LBHI filed for bankruptcy before LBIE filed for administration; or (2) LBHI
filed for bankruptcy at the same time LBIE filed for administration.288
These decisions raise several issues. First, the BNY decision is important
because when read together with the decision in the Metavante matter, it seems
to indicate that a Payment Suspension Clause or Walkaway Clause would not
be enforceable if the Non-defaulting Party seeking to enforce such a clause
seeks to do so based not on the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, but based on the
bankruptcy filing of the Debtor’s Parent-Guarantor or based one any one of the
Debtor’s affiliates.289 Indeed, as mentioned above, market participants that
enter into derivative transactions under an ISDA Master Agreement are
generally large corporations comprised of various affiliates within the same
corporate enterprise.
It is common to have a situation like the one in the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy where the Parent-Guarantor guarantees the obligations of its
subsidiaries under an ISDA Master Agreement.290 Likewise, it is not
uncommon for a parent company to file for chapter 11 protection first, and
gradually place its subsidiaries into chapter 11 protection over a time period
spanning approximately one or more months.291 If the precedent were
otherwise, the creditors of both the parent and of any of its affiliates could be
deprived of valuable payment rights falling under an ISDA Master Agreement
if a scenario like the one in the Metavante matter or BNY arose.292
287 Id.; see Jeannette K. Boot & Michael T. Nguyen, A Transatlantic Tangle: U.S. and U.K. Take
Opposite Positions on Section 2(a)(iii), FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Aug. 2012, at 1 (discussing Lomas
and similar UK cases).
288 See Lomas, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3372 [114]–[117].
289 See, e.g., September 15 Transcript, supra note 48, at 103–12; Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY
Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 418–20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
290 See Howard T. Spilko & Cesar Bello, What Every Hedge Fund Should Know in Structuring Its ISDA
Derivatives Facilities, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, 2005 WLNR 18137166 (Nov. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/Publication/a6807aff-0e34-4502-96b5-03828bfca537/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/6a617048-0673-4924-857b-0357d9a551fb/3989_KLNews_Spilko_v2.pdf.
291 See, e.g., Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007—1 Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc.), 452 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); BNY, 422 B.R. at 418–19. This also occurred in other
large chapter 11 cases such as Enron and WorldCom. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 357 B.R. 32, 35 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting different bankruptcy petition dates of parent company and subsidiaries); In re
WorldCom, Inc., 2005 WL 3832065 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting different bankruptcy petition dates of
parent company and subsidiaries).
292 See, e.g., Ballyrock, 452 B.R. at 34–35, 39–40.
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Secondly, the BNY decision is important because it may provide a
modicum of clarity as to what would occur if Congress repealed the Safe
Harbors, as several academics have urged.293 Consider the following scenario.
The Safe Harbors are repealed. A Debtor that is a party to an ISDA Master
Agreement and its Parent-Guarantor both file for bankruptcy, either on the
same date or on different dates. Now the Non-defaulting Party seeks to either
terminate the ISDA Master Agreement or enforce a Payment Suspension
Clause, a Walkaway Clause (if applicable), or a Flip Clause (if applicable). In
such a scenario, the Debtor would argue that such clauses are unenforceable
ipso facto clauses under §§ 365 and 541. The Non-defaulting Party, however,
could argue that, even though the Safe Harbors were repealed, it sought to
exercise its contractual rights to terminate the ISDA Master Agreement, or its
contractual rights under a Payment Suspension Clause, a Walkaway Clause, or
a Flip Clause, based not on the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, but on the filing of
its Parent-Guarantor or one of its affiliates, which, as a completely separate
corporate entity, could arguably qualify as a separate bankruptcy filing.
Furthermore, clarity regarding this situation is not just important to the
Non-defaulting Party to an ISDA Master Agreement and a Debtor (and one or
more of the Debtor’s affiliates). As mentioned above, many parties in
structured financing transactions (including CDO transactions) and similar
type of structured transactions are SPVs.294 In these types of structured
transactions, an asset manager generally “manages” the assets of the SPV,
including any derivative transactions to which the SPV may be a party.295
When the Lehman entities filed for chapter 11 protection, asset managers
found themselves terminating derivative transactions on behalf of the SPVs
they managed.296 These asset managers most likely thought that Payment
Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, and Flip Clauses were enforceable
under the Safe Harbors or were enforceable because such clauses were
triggered by LBHI’s bankruptcy filing, not LBSF’s.297 Disputes also arose as to
the Early Termination Amounts owed as the result of such early
terminations.298 Depending on the exculpatory language contained in the
293

See generally Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, supra note 8.
See supra text accompanying note 108.
295 See, e.g., IFTIKHAR U. HYDER, THE BARCLAYS CAPITAL GUIDE TO CASH FLOW COLLATERAL DEBT
OBLIGATIONS 21 (2002), available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/ABS/barclays_cdoguide.pdf.
296 See, e.g., Harrier Complaint, supra note 104.
297 See, e.g., id.
298 See generally Adversary Complaint and Objection, Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Nomura Sec. Co.,
No. 10-03229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Nomura Complaint].
294
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relevant asset management agreements, such asset managers could be liable to
the note holders of the SPVs for terminating swap transactions that, had they
been left in place, may not have triggered such high Early Termination
Amount liabilities.299
Although the BNY decision has provided some clarity, it, like the decision
in the Metavante matter, is merely a bankruptcy court decision from one
circuit. There are no other decisions from other circuits or any higher level
courts in the U.S. that have ruled on the same issues. This lack of precedent is
further complicated by the holdings in the U.K. courts, which reached
conclusions opposite to those reached by the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.300 Indeed, the decisions of the U.K. courts
could be persuasive authority to different U.S. courts regarding the same
issues.
To remedy this issue, Congress should amend the Code to so that it is clear
that Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, and Flip Clauses301 are
299 Later, issues arose as to whether these Asset Managers had authority to enter into settlements with the
Lehman Entities in certain mandatory, non-binding alternative dispute resolution proceedings. See Andrew J.
Olejnik, Lehman Brothers’ ADR Procedures for Resolving Its Derivative Contracts in Bankruptcy, BANKR.
STRATEGIST, June 2012, available at http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/9813/original/081061201_
Jenner.pdf; see also Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code & General Order M390 for Authorization to Implement Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures for Affirmative Claims of the
Debtors Under Derivatives Transactions with Special Purpose Vehicle Counterparties at 6–7, In re Lehman
Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), ECF No. 13009. Some Asset
Management Agreements were not clear as to whether the Asset Manager had such authority. See id.; see also
Ltd. Objection of Bank of America, N.A. Successor by Merger to Lasalle Bank, N.A., Solely in Its Capacity as
Trustee Under Certain Pooling and Servicing Agreements to Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Section 105(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code & General Order M-390 for Authorization to Implement Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedures for Affirmative Claims of the Debtors Under Derivatives Transactions with Special Purpose
Vehicle Counterparties at 4–7, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Dec. 9, 2010), ECF No. 13343;
Joinder of HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee, in Objection of the Bank of N.Y. Mellon, the Bank of N.Y.
Mellon Trust Co., N.A. and BNY Corp. Trustee Services. Ltd. to Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Section 105(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code & General Order M-390 for Authorization to Implement Alternative Dispute
Resolution Procedures for Affirmative Claims of the Debtors Under Derivatives Transactions with Special
Purpose Vehicle Counterparties, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Dec. 8, 2010), ECF No. 13315.
300 See generally Boot & Nguyen, supra note 287 (discussing Lomas and similar UK cases).
301 Some commentators have suggested that the unenforceability of Flip Clauses in the bankruptcy context
could adversely affect the credit ratings of the notes issued in connection with certain structured finance
transactions. See Jones, et al., supra note 39, at 344–45. To address this situation, such transactions could be
structured in a different fashion. For example, the payment waterfall provision used in structured financing
transactions could be drafted so that the swap provider is paid after the noteholders both where: (1) the swap
provider has not experienced an Event of Default and (2) the swap provider has experienced an Event of
Default. Of course, a sponsor may not favor this approach because it may delay payment of part of the
administrative costs of such a structured financing transaction until the various noteholders are paid in full.
Such a structure may also result in increased swap pricing.
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not enforceable against a Debtor where the Non-defaulting Party seeks to
enforce such clauses based on (1) that Debtor’s financial condition or
bankruptcy filing or (2) the financial condition or bankruptcy filing of any one
of the Debtor’s affiliates.302 Such an amendment to the Code would clarify the
enforceability of the Payment Suspension Clauses, Flip Clauses, and
Walkaway Clauses in the bankruptcy context and would lead to easier risk
management for Non-defaulting Parties on the one hand, and make the Code
more workable for the reorganization of financial institutions on the other
hand.303 Likewise, such clarity would likely make the task of drafting Living
Wills easier. Entities that are required to draft Living Wills are large
“integrated enterprises” consisting of numerous subsidiaries within one
corporate enterprise that would likely face the same issues the Lehman entities
faced regarding the enforceability of Payment Suspension Clauses, Flip
Clauses, and Walkaway Clauses if such entities were to file for bankruptcy
protection.
E. Triangular Setoff Clauses
1. Cross-Affiliate Netting and Triangular Setoff
As mentioned above, market participants frequently insert Triangular
Setoff Clauses into the Schedule to the ISDA Master Agreement as a credit
risk management device so that they can net out credit exposures among
multiple subsidiaries and affiliates that fall within the same corporate
302

Such an amendment could read something similar to the following language:
Any provision in any agreement whatsoever, whether or not such agreement qualifies as a swap
agreement, repurchase agreement, forward contract, master netting agreement or any other
agreement related thereto or protected under §§ 362(b)(6), (7), (17); 546(e), (f), (g); 555; 556;
560 and 561 of this Title that suspends, conditions, or extinguishes a payment obligation of a
party, in whole or in part, or does not create a payment obligation of a party that would otherwise
exist, or elevates the payment priority of a party in a payment priority provision related to any of
the aforementioned agreements, shall not be enforceable if such provision is based on (i) the
insolvency or financial condition of the debtor or any one of its affiliates; or (ii) the
commencement of a case by the debtor or any one of the debtor’s affiliates under this title.

Alternatively, such language could include a time restriction (i.e. thirty to sixty-days) within which the
separate bankruptcy filings of a Debtor and its particular affiliate(s) must occur in order for a Walkaway
Clause, Payment Suspension Clause, or Flip Clause to be rendered ineffective against both the Debtor and its
particular affiliate(s).
303 It seems that there is more clarity regarding such clauses under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act than
there is under the Code. See Mark A. McDermott & David M. Turetsky, Restructuring Large, SystemicallyImportant, Financial Companies, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 401, 431–32 (2011) (discussing Walkaway
Clauses and the Lehman decisions).
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enterprise of a counterparty to an ISDA Master Agreement.304 Until recently,
there was a widely held belief among market participants that these Triangular
Setoff Clauses were enforceable in the bankruptcy context.305 Several recent
court decisions have caused anxiety among market participants regarding this
belief.306 Two of these decisions came out of the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware. One of these decisions was the SemCrude case.307 The
other was a recent decision in the American Home Mortgage chapter 11
proceedings.308 The other decision is a Bankruptcy Court Decision arising from
a dispute between Lehman Brothers, Inc. and UBS AG (the “UBS Decision”).
a. SemCrude and American Home Mortgage
In SemCrude,309 the bankruptcy court held that Chevron Products Company
could not enforce a Triangular Setoff agreement against SemCrude and two of
its affiliates, all of which filed for chapter 11 protection.310 The bankruptcy
court in SemCrude stated that “mutuality” as set forth in § 553, could not be
created by contract and that there was not a “contractual exception” to the
mutuality requirement set forth in § 553.311
As the Triangular Setoff agreement was associated with three separate
agreements for the purchase and sale of commodities with the SemCrude
debtors, Chevron moved for reconsideration on January 20, 2009, arguing that
the contracts at issue qualified as forward contracts or swap agreements, and
thus fell under the Safe Harbors.312 The SemCrude court denied Chevron’s
Motion for Reconsideration on procedural grounds.313 In November 2013, the
304 See Fabien Carruzzo, Managing Credit Risk of Derivatives Counterparties—A Practical Approach,
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Sept. 2010, at 10, 14–15 (discussing Triangular Setoff).
305 See generally Lauren Teigland-Hunt, Chevron’s Bermuda Triangle: Delaware Bankruptcy Court
Refuses To Enforce Contractual Cross-Affiliate Setoff Rights, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Apr. 2009, at
1.
306 See, e.g., Sass v. Barclays Bank P.L.C. (In re Am. Home Mortg., Holdings, Inc.), 501 B.R. 44 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2013); In re Lehman Bros. Inc. (UBS Decision), 458 B.R. 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
307 See generally Teigland-Hunt, supra note 305, at 29 (stating that SemCrude caused much concern
among market participants).
308 Am. Home Mortg., Holdings, Inc., 501 B.R. 44.
309 In re SemCrude, L.P., 399 B.R. 388 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
310 Chevron Prods. Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 428 B.R. 590, 592 (D. Del. 2010).
311 See id. at 594.
312 See Chevron Products Co.’s Motion for Reconsideration at 2, SemCrude, L.P., 428 B.R. 590 (No. 0811525), ECF No. 2853. Those agreements were related to the purchase and sale of crude oil, gasoline, butane,
isobutene, and propane. See id.
313 See SemCrude, L.P., 428 B.R. at 595. The bankruptcy court denied Chevron’s Motion for
Reconsideration because, inter alia, Chevron failed to argue that the Triangular Setoff agreement at issue
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware applied the ruling in SemCrude
to derivative transactions and held that Triangular Setoff Clauses are not
enforceable under the Safe Harbors.314
b. The UBS Decision
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, ruling on a
dispute between UBS, AG (“UBS”), and Lehman Brothers, Inc. (“LBI”), held
that a Triangular Setoff clause contained in an ISDA Master Agreement is not
enforceable in the bankruptcy context because “mutuality,” as required by
§ 553, cannot be created by contract.315 The bankruptcy court further held that
the Safe Harbors do not validate Triangular Setoff Clauses.316
The UBS Decision involved the following facts: UBS and LBI entered into
an ISDA Master Agreement, Schedule, and CSA.317 The Schedule contained a
Triangular Setoff Clause.318 UBS and LBI then entered into various currency
swaps that fell under their ISDA Master Agreement.319 UBS terminated the
ISDA Master Agreement with LBI on September 16, 2008.320 At that time,
UBS held approximately $170 million worth of collateral.321 A short time later,
LBI filed for SIPA liquidation.322 Later, UBS sent a calculation notice to LBI
claiming a setoff right against LBI regarding a portion of the collateral.323 UBS
and LBI agreed that UBS had a right to set-off a portion of the collateral.324
qualified as a safe harbored contract prior to the bankruptcy court’s earlier decision. See id. The United States
District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed the SemCrude decision. Id. at 595. Chevron
appealed the District Court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Samson
Energy Res. v. Luke Oil Co. (In re SemCrude L.P.), 728 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court’s
dismissal and remanding for hearing on the merits).
314 Sass v. Barclays Bank P.L.C. (In re Am. Home Mortg., Holdings, Inc.), 501 B.R. 44, 57–60 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2013) (holding that Triangular Setoff Clauses are not enforceable under the Safe Harbors). The
bankruptcy court in the American Home Mortgage decision found the UBS Decision to be very persuasive. See
id.
315 In re Lehman Bros. Inc. (“UBS Decision”), 458 B.R. 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
316 Id. at 143–44.
317 Id. at 137.
318 Id. at 138.
319 Id. at 137.
320 Id. UBS terminated the ISDA Master Agreement based on a cross-default stemming from swap
agreements between UBS and some of LBI’s affiliates and the lowering of LBI’s credit rating. Id.
321 Id.
322 Id. LBI was a licensed-broker dealer and wholly-owned subsidiary of LBHI. Id. at 138. Broker dealers
cannot file for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, but instead file for SIPA liquidation. See Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (2012).
323 UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 137.
324 Id. at 137–38.
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The parties, however, disagreed on UBS’s right to retain approximately $23
million of collateral based on the Triangular Setoff Clause contained in the
schedule to the ISDA.325 UBS argued, inter alia, that the Triangular Setoff
Clause was enforceable and allowed it to hold the $23 million in collateral
based on amounts that LBI owed to two UBS affiliates: UBS Securities L.L.C.
and UBS Financial Services.326
As mentioned above, the bankruptcy court rejected UBS’s arguments and
held that the Triangular Setoff Clause was not enforceable in the bankruptcy
context.327 First, the bankruptcy court looked to the express language of § 553
and stated that a party must demonstrate the following factors to exercise a
right of setoff in the bankruptcy (or SIPA) context: (1) the amount owed by the
debtor must be a debt that arose before the date of the debtor’s bankruptcy (or
SIPA) filing; (2) the amount owed by the debtor to the creditor must also be a
debt that arose before the debtor’s bankruptcy (or SIPA filing); and (3)
mutuality must exist between the “debtor’s claim against the creditor and the
debt owed the creditor.”328 The bankruptcy court then stated that, in the
bankruptcy (or SIPA) context, Triangular Setoff Clauses violate the mutuality
requirement of § 553 because “courts consistently find debts to be mutual only
when they are in the same right and between the same parties, standing in the
same capacity.”329
325 Id. at 138–39 (discussing dispute over collateral). Of the approximate $23 million at issue in the UBS
Decision, approximately $1.7 million resulted from a mistaken wire transfer from LBI to UBS Securities
L.L.C., a UBS Subsidiary. Id. at 136. The mistaken wire transfer issue is not relevant to the issues discussed in
this Article.
326 Id. at 138–39.
327 Id. at 139.
328 Id. at 139–40 (citations omitted). The bankruptcy court cited to its prior decision in Swedbank. In re
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (Swedbank), 433 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). In that case, LBHI had a
bank account at Swedbank. Id. at 104. After LBHI’s bankruptcy filing, the funds in the account grew
substantially based on postpetition deposits and wire transfers. Id. at 105–06. Swedbank sought to set off this
postpetition amount against a prepetition debt LBHI owed to Swedbank based on the termination of several
ISDA Master Agreements LBHI guaranteed. Id. The bankruptcy court held that Swedbank could not set off a
prepetition debt against the amounts that were placed into LBHI’s bank account during the postpetition period,
because those debts were not “mutual.” Id. at 110–12. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision. Swedbank AB (PUBL) v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 445 B.R. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’g Swedbank, 433 B.R. 101; see also Peter
Marchetti, Lehman Decision Holds that Mutuality Must Exist to Exercise a Right of Setoff, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., July 2010, at 30 (discussing Swedbank in detail).
329 UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 140 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The bankruptcy court
further stated:

The clarity of [§ 553] is conclusive—mutuality quite literally is tied to the identity of a particular
creditor that owes an offsetting debt. The right is personal, and there simply is no ability to get
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In reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy court analyzed prior decisions
that seemed to recognize a contract exception that would allow a party to
enforce a Triangular Setoff Clause in the bankruptcy context.330 The
bankruptcy court pointed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in
Inland Steel Co. v. Berger Steel Co. (“Berger Steel”).331 The bankruptcy court
noted that although Berger Steel, in dicta, discussed the ability of parties to
contract for Triangular Setoff, the Seventh Circuit did not expressly state that
such an agreement would be enforceable in the bankruptcy context.332 The
bankruptcy court concluded that Berger Steel was misquoted by several later
courts for the proposition that a Triangular Setoff Clause would be enforceable
in the bankruptcy context.333
The bankruptcy court went on to hold that although the Safe Harbors allow
a Non-defaulting, non-debtor Party to exercise any contractual right regardless
of the automatic stay, they do not permit such a party to enforce a Triangular

around this language. Parties may freely contract for Triangular Setoff rights, but not in
derogation of these mandates of the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at 141.
330 Id. at 141–42. The bankruptcy court in SemCrude engaged in a similar analysis regarding cases that
had discussed Triangular Setoff agreements. See In re SemCrude, L.P., 399 B.R. 388, 394 (Bankr. D. Del.
2009).
331 UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 141–42; see also Inland Steel Co. v Berger Steel Co. (In re Berger Steel
Co.), 327 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1964).
332 UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 142–43. The bankruptcy court in SemCrude engaged in a similar analysis.
See SemCrude, 399 B.R. at 394; Pamela Foohey, In re SemCrude LP: Reigning in Triangular Setoff and
Preserving Creditor Equality, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2009, at 44 (discussing SemCrude in detail).
Although case law exists that seems to state that Triangular Setoff Clauses are enforceable, support for that
proposition is not very strong and each case’s statement to that effect “was essentially dicta.” Id. at 44.
333 UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 141–42. The bankruptcy court stated:
An examination of the decisions [following Berger Steel] that are thought to imply that the courts
would have enforced a Triangular Setoff right [in the bankruptcy context] if there had been such
an agreement lends support to the finding in SemCrude that the so-called contract exception cited
in these cases actually was created by a game of ‘whisper down the lane’ from decision to
decision.
....
Conceivably, the courts in these cases might have mistakenly enforced a triangular setoff right
simply on the basis of string citations if presented with an enforceable agreement for Triangular
setoff, but that does not establish a legitimate basis for a contractual exception to the requirement
of mutuality. These cases assume the existence of a contract exception but fail to engage in any
analysis demonstrating that the exception actually fits within the statutory scheme. . . . There
simply is no contract exception [allowing a party to enforce a Triangular Setoff Clause in the
bankruptcy context].
Id. at 142.
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Setoff Clause.334 The bankruptcy court reasoned any rights that a Nondefaulting, non-debtor party to an ISDA Master Agreement seeks to exercise
under the Safe Harbors “must exist in the first place.”335 The bankruptcy court
did note, however, that a Triangular Setoff Clause may be enforceable outside
of the bankruptcy (or SIPA) context.336
Indeed, there seems to be some tension between the UBS Decision and the
BNY decision. Recall that, in the BNY decision, the court stated (1) that it did
not matter whether the LBHI Petition Date or the LBSF Petition Date triggered
an ipso facto clause; and (2) that the Lehman debtors’ different corporate
enterprises comprised an “integrated enterprise” and that “the financial
condition of one [Lehman] affiliate affects the others.”337 In the UBS Decision,
however, the same bankruptcy court held that mutuality for purposes of § 553
could not be created by contract, even though UBS sought to set off amounts
owed to it by two Debtors in the same “integrated enterprise.”338 Therefore, it
seems as if the bankruptcy court allowed two different Debtors that were
affiliates in the same corporate enterprise to use §§ 365 and 541 as a “sword”
against a Non-defaulting Party to an ISDA Master Agreement to invalidate an
ipso facto clause, while simultaneously, in a different case, allowing two
different Debtors that were affiliates in the same corporate enterprise to use §
553 as a “shield” to prevent a Non-defaulting Party to an ISDA Master
Agreement containing a triangular setoff clause to enforce that clause.339
Despite the decisions in American Home Mortgage and UBS, issues remain
regarding the certainty of the enforceability of Triangular Setoff Clauses
contained in an ISDA Master Agreement or a Clearing Agreement in the
bankruptcy context. First, although criticized by the UBS Decision, several
decisions have stated in dicta that an agreement providing for Triangular Setoff

334

Id. at 143.
Id. The bankruptcy court also pointed to the district court’s decision affirming Swedbank. See id. In
that decision, the district court stated it was important that “there is no mention in the legislative history that
the Safe Harbor Provisions were intended to eliminate the mutuality requirement [contained in § 553].”
Swedbank AB (PUBL) v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 445 B.R. 130, 137
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’g In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (Swedbank), 433 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010).
336 UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 144.
337 See Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.),
422 B.R. 407, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Charter Commc’ns
Operating LLC (In re Charter Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 221, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
338 See UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 139–41.
339 See BNY, 422 B.R. at 418; UBS Decision, 458 B.R. at 139–41.
335
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is enforceable in the bankruptcy context.340 Likewise, the American Home
Mortgage and UBS decisions are decisions of bankruptcy courts, not a circuit
court of appeals, which could reach a different conclusion. Therefore,
bankruptcy courts in different circuits could reach a different decision on the
same issue.
Secondly, neither the American Home decision nor the UBS Decision
address a situation where one (or both) of the bankrupt parties to the Triangular
Setoff agreement served as a guarantor of the other’s obligations under the
ISDA Master Agreement. Those facts were not before the bankruptcy courts
that rendered those decisions.341 In such a situation, an argument could be
made that such a guarantee arrangement would create mutuality for purposes
of § 553.342
2. Dodd-Frank Act and Triangular Setoff
As mentioned above, if certain stringent conditions are met, the recentlyenacted Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth an alternative insolvency

340 See, e.g., In re Garden Ridge Corp., 338 B.R. 627, 634 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); U.S. Nat’l Bank v.
Custom Coals Laurel (In re Custom Coals Laurel), 258 B.R. 597, 607 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); Equibank v.
Hildebrand Mach. Co. (In re Lang Mach. Corp.), No. 86–00415, 1988 WL 110429 at *5 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct.
19, 1988); Eckles v. Petco Inc., Interstate (In re Balducci Oil Co.), 33 B.R. 847, 853 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983);
see also Bloor v. Shapiro, 32 B.R. 993, 1001–02 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
341 This guarantee issue would be relevant to a situation like the one in SemCrude, where a Nondefaulting, non-debtor party sought to set off an amount it owed to one bankrupt debtor against an amount
owed to it from an affiliate of such a debtor. The situation in the UBS Decision, however, was different,
because there UBS attempted to use the Triangular Setoff Clause to set-off an amount it owed to LBI against
amounts LBI owed to other UBS affiliates.
342 See In re SemCrude, L.P., 399 B.R. 388, 397 n.7 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (stating that courts are divided
on whether a guarantee can create mutuality for enforceable Triangular Setoff agreement). Compare Bloor, 32
B.R. at 1001–02 (stating that mutuality existed in context of guarantee), with In re Ingersoll, 90 B.R. 168, 171–
72 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that guarantee did not create mutuality); see also Ian Cuillerier & Yvette
Valdez, Lehman Bankruptcy Court Denies Contractual Right to Triangular Setoff, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES
L. REP., Feb. 2012, at 1, 6–7 (stating that courts are divided on guarantee issue). A Triangular Setoff
agreement may be enforceable if an ISDA Master Agreement is executed among parties on a “joint and several
basis.” Id. at 7; see Martin J. Bienenstock et al., Are Triangular Setoff Agreements Enforceable in
Bankruptcy?, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (2009) (discussing SemCrude and arguing that Triangular Setoff
agreements should be enforceable). Parties may be able to mitigate the risk that a court will deem a right of
setoff in a Triangular Setoff arrangement as lacking mutuality by entering “into mutual guarantees of their
respective affiliates’ debts at the inception of trading, and the guarantees should provide that they shall be
enforced by setoffs on settlement dates if the parties desire to replicate the rights and remedies of the
Triangular Setoff agreement.” Id. at 343. Furthermore, “[t]he master agreements and their termination
provisions should expressly provide that affiliates assume their affiliates’ debt for purposes of enabling the
parties to set off on settlement dates.” Id.
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regime to the Code for SIFIs.343 Other than placing a 24-hour stay on the
ability of a Non-defaulting Party to exercise its termination and liquidation
rights against a SIFI liquidating under Title II, for the most part, Title II
contains certain safe harbors very similar to the Safe Harbors contained in the
Code.344
One major difference between the Code and Title II, however, is that under
Title II there seems to be clarity regarding the unenforceability of Payment
Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, and Flip Clauses.345 The ability of a
Non-defaulting Party to enforce a Triangular Setoff Clause, under the DoddFrank Act, however, is not so clear. Indeed, the Set-Off provision contained in
Title II is virtually identical to § 553.346 Therefore it seems that much of the
uncertainty discussed above regarding Triangular Setoff Clauses in the
bankruptcy context could also arise under a Title II proceeding.
Compounding this situation is that, as mentioned above, the Dodd-Frank
Act, through the Swaps Push Out Rule, may require certain financial
institutions to conduct certain derivative transactions through certain
affiliates.347 Likewise, many of these same financial institutions may be
required to periodically submit Living Wills to the FDIC and FRB.348
Furthermore, as mentioned above, because many of these swaps may be
required to be cleared, the Clearing Agreements or the associated ISDA Master
Agreements entered into in connection with many of those swaps may contain
Triangular Setoff Clauses aimed at favoring the Clearinghouse.
Will a Triangular Setoff Clause be enforceable in such a situation if one of
those financial institutions along with its affiliates ends up filing for chapter
11? Should cross-guarantees be involved under which the Parent and
subsidiary or affiliates guarantee each other’s obligations? What would result
in a Title II proceeding? What did the Living Wills say about Triangular
Setoff? Were those predictions accurate?

343 Generally speaking, only the largest financial institutions would qualify as a SIFI under Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act, making that insolvency scheme unavailable for many entities. See supra note 167–168 and
accompanying text.
344 See supra Part II.D.
345 See supra Part II.E.
346 Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(a)(12)(A), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390(a)(12)(A) (2012), with 11 U.S.C. § 553.
347 See supra note 123.
348 See supra note 121.
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It seems that the answers to these questions are not 100% clear. To provide
more clarity regarding the enforceability of Triangular Setoff Clauses in this
situation, both the Code and the Dodd-Frank Act should be amended. A
sensible amendment would clarify that Triangular Setoff Clauses are
enforceable where there are either (1) mutual guarantees between the Parent
and subsidiaries’ or affiliates’ derivatives obligations or (2) where such
derivative transactions are entered into on a joint and several basis among the
different corporate affiliates.349
IV. VALUATION
Valuation issues pervade bankruptcy proceedings. Most likely, the agreed
upon valuation methodology contained in an ISDA Master Agreement will be
enforceable.350 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York,
in a recent decision involving a dispute between LBSF and the Michigan State
Housing Development Authority (“MSHDA”), held that the Safe Harbors,
specifically § 560, protected MSHDA’s right to use a liquidation and valuation
methodology clause contained in an ISDA Master Agreement, even though the
agreed upon market quotation methodology resulted in a termination value that
was less favorable to LBSF than the methodology that would have applied
(Mid Market or Mid-Point methodology) had LBSF not filed for chapter 11
protection.351
349 Another alternative is simply to permit triangular setoff if each entity within the corporate structure
signs an agreement (including an ISDA Master Agreement) that permits the Non-defaulting Party to conduct
triangular setoff. Indeed, the difference between having the various entities guarantee each other’s liability
versus signing agreements permitting triangular setoff seems to involve an element of “form over substance.”
See, e.g., Bienenstock et al., supra note 342 (discussing SemCrude and arguing that Triangular Setoff
agreements should be enforceable).
350 See generally Mich. State Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Derivative Prods. (In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc.), 502 B.R. 383 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
351 Id. at 392–94. MSHDA had entered into an interest rate swap documented under an ISDA Master
Agreement (the “MSHDA Swap Agreement”) with Lehman Brothers Derivative Products (“LBDP”) to hedge
interest rate risk associated with variable rate municipal bonds it issued. Id. at 387. If LBHI filed for
bankruptcy, the terms of the MSHDA Swap Agreement compelled LBDP to terminate the swap agreement
within five days of LBHI’s bankruptcy filing and to calculate damages at a “mid-market” price, id. at 388,
which “ effectively splits the ‘bid-ask spread’ between the parties, rather than relying only on the prices on the
Non-defaulting Party’s side of the transaction.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Michigan State Housing
Development Authority’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Mich. State Hous. Dev. Auth., 502 B.R.
383 (No. 09-01728), ECF No. 31-2. The “spread” or difference between these two prices may vary in different
markets. Noh, supra note 180, at 5. According to MSHDA, LBHI, following its bankruptcy filing, requested
that MSHDA assign the MSHDA Swap Agreement to LBSF. Mich. State Hous. Dev. Auth., 502 B.R. at 389.
In the assignment transaction, the parties agreed that if LBSF committed an Event of Default by filing for
bankruptcy or by failing to pay any amount due to MSHDA, then MSHDA, as the Non-defaulting Party,
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This decision, however, does not impact a chapter 11 debtor’s ability to
challenge, in good faith, the Close-out Amount claimed by the Non-defaulting
Party.352 Valuation is not an exact science. It becomes much more complex
when dealing with derivative transactions, especially OTC derivatives that are
not traded over an exchange.353
An ongoing dispute between LBSF and Nomura International PLC
(“Nomura”) highlights this issue.354 In this dispute (the “Nomura Dispute”)
Nomura entered into an ISDA Master Agreement with LBSF.355 More than
2,000 derivative transactions fell thereunder.356 Following the termination of
that ISDA Master Agreement, Nomura claimed that LBHI and LBSF owed
Nomura $443,978,774.357 LBHI and LBSF, on the other hand, objected to
Nomura’s claim. Instead, LBHI and LBSF argued that Nomura improperly
followed the valuation methodology contained in the ISDA Master Agreement,
would be able to terminate the MSHDA Swap Agreement and use the Market Quotation methodology instead
of the “mid-market” methodology to value the Early Termination Amount. Id. at 388. Market Quotation was
more favorable to MSHDA than the “mid-market” methodology if MSHDA was the Non-defaulting Party. Id.;
see also, Noh, supra note 180 (discussing valuation issues associated with derivative transactions).
LBSF later filed for chapter 11 protection and, at that time, was in the money under the swap
agreement. Mich. State Hous. Dev. Auth., 502 B.R. at 389. MSHDA terminated the swap agreement using the
Market Quotation methodology, which resulted in MSHDA owing less money to LBSF than it would have if
the “mid-market” valuation methodology had applied. Id. The court held in favor of MSHDA. Id. at 395–96.
Of course, if a valuation methodology includes a Payment Suspension Clause, a Walkaway Clause, or a
Flip Clause, such clauses would most likely not be enforceable in the bankruptcy context. See id. at 386
(distinguishing rulings regarding such clauses from ruling regarding pure valuation methodology clauses).
Indeed, At first blush, this decision seems to conflict with the holding of BNY regarding Flip Clauses.
Compare id. at 389, with Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). With respect to this issue, the Michigan State Housing
Development Authority court noted:
There is a significant difference between the reordering of priorities within a hierarchy of
distributions (an ipso facto contractual term that is not mentioned in Section 560) and selecting
which method to use when disposing and valuing collateral in connection with liquidating a
terminated swap agreement. The choice of an accepted and contractually specified method to
liquidate, even if it produces a less desirable result from the point of view of the debtor, is
consistent with full implementation of the exemption that is codified in Section 560.
Mich. State Hous. Dev. Auth., 502 B.R. at 387; see 11 U.S.C. § 560.
352 See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (providing debtor with ability to object to claims filed against debtor).
353 See generally Sarah Sharer Curley & Elizabeth Fella, Where to Hide? How Valuation of Derivatives
Haunts the Courts Even After BAPCPA, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 297 (2009) (discussing complexity of valuing
derivatives in bankruptcy).
354 See Nomura Complaint, supra note 298.
355 See id. at 2.
356 Id. at 7.
357 Id. at 5. Unlike many ISDA Master Agreements in the U.S., the one between Nomura and LBSF
provided Automatic Early Termination, which termination occurred on the LBHI Petition Date. See id. at 3.
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vastly inflated its claims in a commercially unreasonable manner, and owed
LBSF “tens of millions of dollars.”358 LBHI and LBSF have raised claims
similar to those raised in the Nomura Dispute against many other Nondefaulting Parties to ISDA Master Agreements with LBSF.359
As mentioned above, the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement contains two
alternative valuation methodologies: Market Quotation and Loss. The 2002
ISDA Master Agreement, however, uses the Close-out Amount
methodology.360 At the time LBHI filed for bankruptcy, the Lehman entities
had hundreds of thousands of trades documented under ISDA Master
Agreements with a large number of Non-defaulting Parties.361 During the
frenzy that followed LBHI’s bankruptcy filing, many of these Non-defaulting
Parties that had terminated ISDA Master Agreements with the Lehman entities
could not obtain quotes.362 During that time period, many of the leading
derivative dealers themselves were too occupied with evaluating their own
exposure to the Lehman entities and did not provide quotes when requested to
do so by other market participants.363 As a result, many Non-defaulting Parties,
like Nomura, reverted to the Loss Methodology and used internal valuation
models and other sources to value their terminated derivative transactions.364
Of course, as those valuation methods did not involve quotes from leading
dealers, those methods could involve factual issues that could be subject to
dispute. For example, a chapter 11 debtor, such as LBSF, could argue that the
valuation methods used by a Non-defaulting Party do not qualify as
“reasonable determinants of value” as required by § 562. Likewise, under
§ 562, a chapter 11 debtor could argue that even if such valuation methods do
so qualify, they were not measured on the next date following the termination
date on which such valuation determinants exist. Such litigation could involve

358 Id. LBHI and LBSF also argued that, approximately one week before the LBHI Petition Date, Nomura
conceded that it owed LBSF approximately $200 million. Id. at 16.
359 See Noh, supra note 180; Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Sues J.P. Morgan Over Claims, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 2012, at C3.
360 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 16, § 6(d). Although the Close-out methodology does
not require a Non-defaulting Party to obtain quotes from parties that deal in derivatives, such quotes are
generally considered stronger valuation evidence because it is derived from quotes of what other leading
dealers in derivate transactions would pay to step into the shoes of the Defaulting Party.
361 See Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 178, at 569, 572–73 (stating that Lehman had more than
900,000 derivative trades at the time of its bankruptcy filing).
362 See Noh, supra note 180.
363 See id.
364 See id.
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disputes of hundreds of millions of dollars365 and would likely require expert
witnesses, which in the case of valuation of derivatives could be quite
costly.366
This Article proposes that Congress should amend the Code so that it is
clear that Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, and Flip Clauses
are not enforceable against a Debtor where a party seeks to enforce such
clauses based on (1) that Debtor’s financial condition or bankruptcy filing; or
(2) the financial condition or bankruptcy filing of any one of such a Debtor’s
affiliates. Furthermore, Congress should amend the Code and Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act so that it is clear that Triangular Setoff Clauses are
enforceable where either affiliated entities both agree to the triangular setoff or
those affiliated entities guarantee each other’s liabilities.
Such clarity may also have a favorable impact on litigation involving the
valuation of terminated swap transactions, especially where the Non-defaulting
Party is out of the money on the day on which a particular Debtor files for
chapter 11. For example, if a Non-defaulting Party knew ahead of time that it
could not suspend payment or otherwise “walkaway” from the termination
amount it owed a debtor upon the debtor’s bankruptcy filing and also was
aware that a chapter 11 debtor could challenge any valuation methodology the
Non-defaulting Party used, the Non-defaulting Party may be incentivized to
work with the chapter 11 debtor so that the debtor could sell the derivative
transactions to a solvent third party. The 48-hour stay on a Non-defaulting
Party’s ability to exercise its termination rights proposed in the Revised Hoover
Group Chapter 14 Proposal would, combined with the reforms proposed in
this Article, strengthen this approach.367
Such a situation would benefit the Non-defaulting Party, who could retain
the derivative transactions with a more solvent assignee. Likewise, the Debtor
would receive a payment for its in-the-money position. Moreover, the
valuation methodology in such a situation would be one of the best
365 See Crédit Agricole Corporate & Inv. Bank N.Y. Branch v. Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc. (In re
Am. Home Morg. Holdings, Inc.), 637 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that parties asserted valuations
were approximately $500 million apart).
366 See Sass v. Barclays Bank P.L.C. (In re Am. Home Mortg., Holdings, Inc.), 501 B.R. 44, 64 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2013) (discussing use of expert witnesses).
367 See REVISED HOOVER GROUP CHAPTER 14 PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at 31–32. Of course, a 48-hour
stay may not be sufficient time period to untangle a large portfolio of derivative transactions. The same may be
true even if a clearinghouse is involved. See generally Julia Lees Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearinghouses and
Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2012).
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methodologies—the price a party is willing to pay for an asset in an arm’slength transaction.368 Indeed, shortly following its bankruptcy filing, LBSF
sought to “sell” many of its ISDA Master Agreements to solvent third parties,
but many Non-defaulting Parties heavily objected to that procedure, possibly
because they mistakenly believed that Payment Suspension Clauses would be
enforceable based on LBHI’s bankruptcy filing, which occurred on a different
date than LBSF’s bankruptcy filing.369
Of course, regulatory measures that are beyond the scope of this Article
could have more of an effect of minimizing valuation disputes over terminated
derivative transactions. For example, if derivatives are traded over exchanges,
there will be more price transparency.370 Therefore, if regulatory reforms
require more derivatives to be exchange-traded, parties could look to the
values of such transactions as they are traded on a particular exchange to
determine value as of a particular date.
CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the recent disputes regarding the ISDA Master
Agreement, uncertainty continues to exist regarding the enforceability of
Payment Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip Clauses, and Triangular
Setoff Clauses in the bankruptcy context. Likewise, the enforceability of a
Triangular Setoff Clause under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act is also not clear.
Congress should amend the Code so that it is clear that Payment Suspension
Clauses, Flip Clauses, and Walkaway Clauses are not enforceable against a
Debtor where a party seeks to enforce such as clause based on (1) that Debtor’s
financial condition or bankruptcy filing; or (2) the financial condition or
bankruptcy filing of any one of that Debtor’s affiliates. Furthermore, Congress
368

See, e.g., Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 976 (N.Y. 1995).
See Legal Alert: Lehman Bankruptcy Developments that Affect Trading Counterparties, SUTHERLAND
(Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.sutherland.com/Search (search for “Lehman Bankruptcy Developments”). LBSF
sought to do this by using the assumption and assignment procedure set forth in § 365. Id. Objections to
LBSF’s attempt to assume and assign these ISDA Master Agreements cited other reasons. Id. As mentioned
above, under a Title II proceeding, Payment Suspension Clauses and Walkaway Clauses are not enforceable
under any circumstances. See 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)(F) (2012) (invalidating Walkaway Clauses). Likewise, a
Non-defaulting Party’s ability to terminate its derivative transactions with a counterparty subject to a Title II
proceeding is stayed for one business day following the commencement of the Title II proceeding. See 12
U.S.C. §5390(c)(10)(B). The aim of these provisions is to transfer derivative transactions of a party subject to
the Title II proceedings to a third party purchaser. See Noh, supra note 180. If such a third party purchaser
cannot be found or if the derivative transactions at issue could not be transferred to a bridge financial company
within that time period, the Non-defaulting Party could terminate its derivative transactions. See id.
370 See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 8, at 154–55.
369
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should amend the Code and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act so that it is clear
that Triangular Setoff Clauses are enforceable where either affiliated entities
both agree to the triangular setoff or those affiliated entities guarantee each
other’s liabilities.
Furthermore, such clarity would be one step in making the Code more
favorable to financial institutions seeking to reorganize their operations. Even
if Congress, pursuant to the Revised Hoover Group Chapter 14 Proposal,
adopts some form of short stay that would apply to a Non-defaulting Party’s
right to terminate (and set off among) its derivative trading contracts with a
large financial institution that is a Debtor, clarity is still needed with respect to
the enforceability of Payments Suspension Clauses, Walkaway Clauses, Flip
Clauses, and Triangular Setoff Clauses in such a scenario if (1) such a stay
expires and (2) such a Debtor is not successful in transferring those
outstanding derivative trading contracts to a solvent party.371
Clarity on these issues would substantially reduce costly and complex
litigation, allowing a Debtor to better focus its time and energy on formulating
a chapter 11 plan of reorganization or liquidation, instead of spending such
time on complex litigation of the Debtor’s rights that are crucial to the
formulation of such a plan. Undoubtedly, such legislation would speed up the
chapter 11 process for debtors involved in derivatives transactions and could
result in greater recoveries to the creditors of a Debtor. Likewise, further
clarity would help mitigate systemic risk in the financial markets by obviating
litigation regarding such rights.

371

See supra note 15.

